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Abstract
This Article discusses the principles under Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community concerning anticompetitive or exclusionary abuses involving pricing issues. This Ar-
ticle is structured as follows. Part I outlines the basic economic thinking behind price discrimina-
tion and identifies the principal legal situations under Article 82 in which it arises. Discriminatory
pricing should only be prohibited (and therefore needs to be justified) in a small number of situa-
tions. Parts II-III discuss the specific situations under Community competition law in which price
discrimination and the legality of pricing practices may be relevant. Part II discusses rebate and
discounting practices, including target (or sales growth) rebates, fidelity or loyalty rebates, and
rebates in return for exclusivity. Part III discusses price discrimination that gives rise to distortions
of competition between customers. This concerns Article 82(c), a provision that has some parallels
with the Robinson-Patman Act under U.S. law. In practice, it will be rare that a profit-maximizing
firm will have the ability or incentive to charge different prices to comparable customers to such an
extent that competition between those customers will be significantly distorted. Part IV discusses
predatory pricing. It is important that prices that remain above average variable cost should nearly
always be treated as legal, since rivals will usually be able, and should be encouraged, to compete
in that scenario. Community competition law should only treat pricing above average variable
cost as unlawful where there is evidence of other abusive behavior linked to that low pricing, in
other words a clear plan to eliminate a rival by using a range of illicit practices. Part V discusses
a specific instance of predatory pricing–cross-subsidization. Cross-subsidy cases are in essence
cases in which the abuse, if there is one, is predatory pricing. Finally, the Conclusion summa-
rizes the author’s comprehension of what the correct principles under Community competition
law concerning pricing practices should be.
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"Whether any particular act of a monopolist is exclusionary, rather
than merely a form of vigorous competition, can be difficult to dis-
cern: the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate com-
petition, are myriad. The challenge for an antitrust court lies in stat-
ing a general rule for distinguishing between exclusionary acts, which
reduce social welfare, and competitive acts, which increase it."'
INTRODUCTION
The above statement neatly encapsulates one of the most
difficult issues in antitrust law: how do you have clear rules that
distinguish between legitimate and unlawful conduct? Nowhere
are these problems more acute than in the area of pricing behav-
ior. The basic question is an apparently simple one: how should
antitrust law draw the line between legitimate and desirable
price competition, on the one hand, and undesirable and unlaw-
ful price competition, on the other? It is important that this bal-
ance is correctly struck: the welfare cost and chilling effect of
discouraging legitimate price competition is considerable; the
cost of allowing unlawful pricing to go unchecked may be no less
serious.
Although a now universally-accepted distinction is drawn in
the European Community ("Community") competition law be-
tween exploitative and exclusionary (or anticompetitive)
* Mr. Temple Lang is a counsel and Mr. O'Donoghue is an associate at Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton (Brussels). Mr. Temple Lang is also a Professor at Trinity
College, Dublin and a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Oxford.
Nicholas Levy, Christopher Cook, and Cynthia Ngwe (Cleary Gottlieb), Professor
George Hay (Cornell University), and Derek Ridyard (RBB Economics) made very use-
ful comments on this Article, but they are not responsible for any errors or omissions
on the authors' part.
1. United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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abuses, 2 very little effort has been made to clarify the general
principles about the kinds of behavior that are contrary to Arti-
cle 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("Ar-
ticle 82") which prohibits abuse of a dominant position. The
case law and practice has arisen pragmatically, and largely in re-
sponse to complaints to the European Commission and appeals
to the Community Courts against Commission decisions adopted
on the basis of such complaints. With the exception of special-
ized Notices and guidance in the telecommunications and postal
sectors, the Commission has not attempted to develop any kind
of general or comprehensive statement on abusive behavior.
There have been several consequences of this unplanned
growth. First, the Commission and the Community Courts have
dealt with individual cases that were said to raise questions of
abuse by reference to the facts of the individual case, seemingly
without having any clear general analytical or intellectual frame-
work for doing so. Second, a number of basic questions have
not been answered or even discussed, because due to the acci-
dents of litigation or otherwise, they did not arise in any of the
cases that have been decided. Finally, the influence that eco-
nomic thinking has had on the Community rules on distribu-
tion, horizontal agreements, and mergers has not been felt, to
the same extent or at all, in the interpretation and application of
Article 82.
This Article discusses the principles under Article 82 con-
cerning anticompetitive or exclusionary abuses involving pricing
issues. Pricing cases have been chosen for several reasons. First,
a fundamental goal of Community competition law is to en-
courage price competition, including price competition from
dominant firms.' Second, pricing practices are relevant to every
2. See BELLAMY & CHILD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF COMPETITION 5TH ED. sec.
9-072 (P.M. Roth QC ed., 2001); see also John Temple Lang, Abuse of Dominant Positions
in European Community Law, Present and Future: Some Aspects, in FirtH ANNUAL FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 41-55 (Barry Hawk ed., 1978).
3. In Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and others v. Comm'n and others,
Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, [2000] E.C.R. 1-1365, Advocate General Fen-
nelly explained the role of price competition in Community law as follows:
Price competition is the essence of the free and open competition which it is
the objective of Community policy to establish on the internal market. It fa-
vors more efficient firms and it is for the benefit of consumers both in the
short and the long run. Dominant firms not only have the right but should be
encouraged to compete on price.
Id. at 1-1411, para. 117. "Community competition law should.., not offer less efficient
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company that is, or may be, dominant: every company has to
have a pricing policy, and needs to know what the constraints on
its policy may be. Third, because low prices nearly always benefit
consumers, any antitrust objections to them should be looked at
critically to ensure that the rules are clear and no more than
necessary in the circumstances. If the rules are not clear or they
are too restrictive, there is a significant risk that legal advisers
will be tempted to give overcautious advice. This in turn could
lead to a chilling of desirable price competition, with potentially
significant welfare implications. Fourth, it is on pricing issues
that the Commission seems most clearly to have gotten away
from both sound economics and good law. A number of Com-
mission statements on pricing practices come perilously close to
stating per se rules against certain forms of pricing behavior.
Other statements are liable to be taken out of context and give
rise to confusion. It is on pricing issues that the Commission is
most obviously running the risk of discouraging legitimate and
desirable competition. It is on pricing issues that a clear and
comprehensive statement of the legal and economic principles is
most urgently needed, not only to guide the thinking of the
Commission, companies, and their lawyers, but also for the gui-
dance of national competition authorities which are intended,
under the Commission's proposals for decentralization of Com-
munity competition law, to apply Article 82 more than they have
in the past. Lastly, pricing issues involve some 'of the more signif-
icant differences between U.S. and European Union ("EU") an-
titrust law, and these should be minimized where possible.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I outlines the basic
economic thinking behind price discrimination and identifies
the principal legal situations under Article 82 in which it arises.
The freedom of a dominant company under Community compe-
tition law to charge different prices for the same product or ser-
vice has given rise to much discussion, and in our view to unnec-
essary confusion. There is no general principle that a dominant
company must not charge different prices for the same product
or service. We argue that. discriminatory pricing should only be
prohibited (and therefore needs to be justified) in a small num-
ber of situations. First, where a dominant company's offering of
undertakings a safe haven against vigorous competition even from dominant undertak-
ings." Id. at 1-1418, para. 132.
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different prices to customers distorts competition in a meaning-
ful way between those customers. This is a "secondary-line"
abuse contrary to Article 82(c). Second, price discrimination
may require justification where it leads to the unlawful exclusion
of rivals, contrary to Article 82(b). This broad category of "pri-
mary line" abuses covers predatory pricing and a range of other
pricing practices that may give rise to exclusion concerns. Price
discrimination may also be relevant in another situation, that is
where a vertically-integrated dominant firm applies less favorable
terms to companies that it supplies but that also compete with its
downstream business. This mainly concerns situations resem-
bling essential facilities and is not discussed here. In each of
these situations of price discrimination, we argue that the princi-
ples of law and economics that apply are different, the anti-com-
petitive effects which the law is intended to prevent are different,
and the defenses which may be relevant are different. But
outside of these specific situations, Community competition law
should make clear that different prices may be freely charged,
and no defense is needed. This is an important conclusion, be-
cause it frees dominant companies from unnecessary and an-
ticompetitive constraints on legitimate competition, and clarifies
the legal analysis.
Parts 11-111 discuss the specific situations under Community
competition law in which price discrimination and the legality of
pricing practices may be relevant. Part II discusses rebate and
discounting practices, including target (or sales growth) rebates,
fidelity or loyalty rebates, and rebates in return for exclusivity. It
is perhaps in regard to these practices that certain Commission
statements appear to deviate most from established economic
thinking. In a number of cases, the Commission has made state-
ments that seem to establish per se rules against the use by domi-
nant firms of these types of normal commercial practices. We
argue that Community competition law on discounting proceeds
from the wrong premise. If the price is not predatory, it should
benefit from a very strong presumption of legality, since it will
generally be pro-competitive and based on efficiencies. The situ-
ation should only be different where the conditions attached to
obtaining the favorable price are anticompetitive. The basic an-
titrust question is whether the customer would have to agree to
an anticompetitive condition, that is to buy exclusively or almost
exclusively from the dominant firm, to obtain the most favorable
[Vol. 26:83
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discount. These cases raise difficult issues and involve considera-
tion of a wide range of factual elements concerning the market
context and foreclosure effect of the rebate in question. How-
ever, we argue that some basic distinctions are clear. If the re-
bate is not individually negotiated with the customer, it will usu-
ally be simply a list price or a generally applicable volume dis-
count that should be regarded as unobjectionable. If the rebate
is individually negotiated, we argue that real issues only arise if it
leads to exclusive or near-exclusive purchasing in circumstances
liable to have a material adverse effect. The availability of a
number of defenses should also be considered. The important
question we address is how Community competition law should
distinguish between price reductions constructed to oblige buy-
ers to buy exclusively from a dominant supplier, on the one
hand, and price reductions legitimately constructed to enable
buyers to get the best price for the maximum quantity they wish
to purchase, on the other.
Part III discusses price discrimination that gives rise to dis-
tortions of competition between customers. This concerns Arti-
cle 82 (c), a provision that has some parallels with the Robinson-
Patman Act under U.S. law. We argue that, in practice, it will be
rare that a profit-maximizing firm will have the ability or incen-
tive to charge different prices to comparable customers to such
an extent that competition between those customers will be sig-
nificantly distorted. Moreover, in many cases, valid defenses will
be available to justify those price differences. This means that
the only clearly identifiable situation under Community compe-
tition law in which the non-discrimination principle would apply
and none of the valid defenses would be available is likely to be
where a State-owned or controlled company charges different
prices to domestic and foreign buyers for protectionist reasons.
In most other situations, a dominant firm will have no incentive
to treat similarly-situated buyers so differently.
Part IV discusses predatory pricing. As in the United States,
this topic has given rise to much discussion in the EU, but very
few cases in which a successful claim has prevailed. In over forty
years of Community competition law, there have only been three
instances in which a dominant firm's prices have been found to
be predatory. In general, Community competition law's ap-
proach to predatory pricing seems reasonable. However, there
are several cases under Community competition law that have
2002]
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treated pricing above average variable cost (and even pricing
above average total cost) as exclusionary. These cases are prob-
lematic because neither the Commission nor Community Courts
have developed a clear analytical framework to explain how
price-cutting that remains above cost harms consumers. We ar-
gue that it is important that prices that remain above average
variable cost should nearly always be treated as legal, since rivals
will usually be able, and should be encouraged, to compete in
that scenario. Our conclusion is that Community competition
law should only treat pricing above average variable cost as un-
lawful where there is evidence of other abusive behavior linked
to that low pricing, in other words a clear plan to eliminate a
rival by using a range of illicit practices.
Part V discusses a specific instance of predatory pricing -
cross-subsidization. We argue that cross-subsidy cases are in es-
sence cases in which the abuse, if there is one, is predatory pric-
ing. There is no abuse of cross-subsidizing in the absence of
predatory prices, since a price that is above cost does not, by
definition, need a subsidy. We also consider what costs must be
taken into account in that situation to determine whether the
lower price is predatory, and in particular, the issue of allocation
of common costs between a competitive and a monopoly market
in the light of the Commission's recent Deutsche Post decision.
Finally, the Conclusion summarizes what we believe should
be the correct principles under Community competition law
concerning pricing practices.
I. PRICE DISCRMINATION UNDER COMMUNITY
COMPETITION LAW
A. Some Basic Economic Concepts
Discriminatory pricing is a broad term that covers a range of
situations in which a company charges different prices for the
same product to similarly-situated customers. Distinguishing be-
tween desirable and undesirable price discrimination lies at the
heart of the underlying welfare objectives of antitrust law. The
economics of price discrimination are complicated, but may be
briefly summarized as follows.4 As a basic premise, economists
4. Derek Ridyard, Exclusionary Pricing and Price Discrimination Abuses Under Article 82
- an Economic Analysis, EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 2002, 23(6), 286-303, has produced a
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consider that marginal pricing - pricing at the level of the extra
cost of producing the last unit of production - maximizes con-
sumer welfare. This creates problems for industries (of which
there are many) that have high fixed costs and need to recover
as much of those costs as possible in order to survive in the long-
term. There is also an additional problem in many "new econ-
omy" industries where marginal costs are very low, but research
and development and innovation costs are high. In these situa-
tions, it makes sense that a company may wish to price above
marginal cost in order to recover some fixed costs for those who
are willing to pay more and at or near marginal cost for those
who can only afford to pay less but might not otherwise be able
to afford the product or service in question. So if marginal costs
are, say, 10% of the list price and there is a customer who is
unwilling or unable to pay more than 50% of the list price for
the product, it is in the interests of both, the customer and the
dominant company to grant the 50% discount. The dominant
company gets a significant positive contribution to its revenues
from the sale. The customer gets a product, which it could not
otherwise afford. The transaction is economically rational and
pro-competitive, and it would harm both parties to prohibit it.
In other words, economists do not tend to view price discrimina-
tion with any particular suspicion, but think that its effects may
be benign or at least not obviously anticompetitive.
B. Price Discrimination Under Article 82
Despite much discussion of price discrimination in the deci-
sional practice of the Commission and the case law of the Com-
munity Courts, it is worth recalling that the only provision of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (the "EC Treaty")
that prohibits discrimination is Article 82(c), which prevents
dominant companies from "applying dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby plac-
ing them at a competitive disadvantage."5 However, the list of
good summary of the basic economic principles, and a useful criticism of the lack of
economic rigor in some recent Commission decisions on pricing under Article 82.
5. Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, art.
82(c), O.J. C 340/3, at 209 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79 at 71 (ex art. 86) [hereinafter Consoli-
dated EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam amending the
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and
certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) (amending Treaty on European
2002]
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abuses in Article 82 is not exhaustive,6 and at least four clear
situations of discrimination can be distinguished:
" Where the dominant enterprise is selling to companies
not otherwise associated with it, and the companies are in
competition with one another. In this situation, it can be
an abuse if the difference in treatment is big enough to
create a competitive disadvantage for the companies sub-
ject to the higher price or the less favorable treatment.
This is the situation envisaged by Article 82(c). It is a
"secondary line" abuse and is discussed in Part III;
• Where the dominant enterprise is treating customers dif-
ferently on the basis of their nationality. Discrimination
on the grounds of nationality is outlawed generally by the
EC Treaty and such behavior is unlawful under Article
82(c). This is also a secondary line abuse and is discussed
in Part III;
" Where the dominant enterprise discriminates in the
terms and conditions and prices that it offers in such a
way that leads to the unlawful exclusion of rivals. In this
situation, the clause in Article 82 that is primarily applica-
ble is Article 82(b) which prohibits "limiting production,
markets, or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers."7 A dominant enterprise is prohibited by this
clause from limiting the production, marketing or techni-
cal development of its competitors, as well as its own.'
This is a "primary line" abuse. In practice, discrimination
in this sense is most likely to occur in two situations. First,
where a dominant firm makes a price reduction condi-
tional on the buyer's making all or nearly all of its
purchases of the product in question from the dominant
Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, and Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
6. See Compagnie Maritime Belge, [2000] E.C.R. at 1-1475, para. 112.
7. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.5, art. 82(b), O.J. C 340/3, at 209 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 71 (ex art. 86).
8. See C66perative vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA and others v. Comm'n, Joined
Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113-14/73, [1975] E.C.R. 1663; Radio Telefis Eireann
(RTE) and Independent Television Publication Ltd. (ITP) v. Comm'n, Joined Cases C-
241/91 P & C-242/91 P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743; Klaus H6fner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron
GmbH, Case C-41/90, [19911 E.C.R. 1-1979; Non-contentious proceedings brought by
Job Centre Coop. arl, Case C-55/96, [1997] E.C.R. 1-7119.
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enterprise. If this kind of abuse is in question, it is the
condition on which the price reduction is, given which is
exclusionary, not the price reduction itself. This situation
is discussed in Part II. Second, where there is predatory
pricing in the broad sense. This situation is discussed in
Part IV; and
Where a vertically integrated dominant enterprise's "up-
stream" activities (e.g., selling an important raw material
or other input) discriminate in favor of the dominant en-
terprise's own downstream activities, and against its com-
petitors in the downstream market, in the terms on which
it supplies the raw material or input. The rule is strict, so
that if the difference in treatment has any economic sig-
nificance, there is no need to prove that the downstream
competitors are suffering any special competitive disad-
vantage. Since this situation mainly deals with situations
resembling essential facilities rather than pricing issues, it
will not be discussed in this Article.
There are several reasons for distinguishing between these
categories. First, there are differences in the strictness of the
applicable rules in each case. Second, a case can only be ana-
lyzed correctly when it is clear into which of these categories it
may fall. Finally, different kinds of defenses apply for each of
the different categories of abuse.
II. DISCOUNTING AND REBATE PRACTICES
Companies rely on a range of different pricing and dis-
counting practices to capture market share and retain the busi-
ness of existing customers. These include "loyalty" or "fidelity"
rebates, target (or market share growth) rebates, and similar in-
centives. Such practices are common in many industries and are
an essential competitive tool in many others. There is no obvi-
ous reason why antitrust law should view such practices with any
particular suspicion, since they typically lead to lower prices,
which should in nearly all cases benefit from strong presump-
tions of legality. Leaving aside issues of bundling and tying, the
situation might be different in only two instances: first, where
the lower price is predatory; and second, where the lower price
is conditional on the customer purchasing all or nearly all of its
requirements from the dominant firm. These objections are dif-
2002]
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ferent; in one case it is the price that is the problem; in the other
it is the exclusionary conditions attached to the favorable price.
This section discusses discounts that exclude competitors by
making discounts dependent on the customer's buying exclu-
sively or almost exclusively from the dominant firm. (Predatory
pricing is discussed in Part IV.)
Community competition law takes the view that rebates that
are conditional on a customer's purchasing all or a large part of
its requirements from a dominant firm may be abusive. In other
words, it recognizes that the conditions attached to the price
may be unlawful. While this is not universally accepted as cor-
rect, it has some doctrinal basis' and is not obviously wrong.'0
However, the difficulty is that a number of recent Commission
statements seem to suggest a general rule that any discount that
is conditional on, or simply creates incentives for, a customer's
buying some of its requirements from a dominant company is
abusive. Other Commission statements suggest that no discount
can be offered by a dominant firm unless justified by cost savings
9. See Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil W. Averitt, Anticompetitive Aspects of
Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 615-39
(2000). While there is some agreement under U.S. law that rebates conditional on
exclusive purchasing may, absent clear efficiencies, be unlawful, there has been little if
any judicial endorsement of a similar analysis for rebates conditional on a customer's
purchasing a large part of its requirements from a dominant firm. Instead, the U.S.
courts have tended to examine whether the discounted price is predatory; if it is not, it
is simply a lower price that competitors should be free to match in the absence of an
exclusive dealing requirement or a discount that is conditional on exclusive dealing.
Thus, in Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000), the 8th
Circuit sanctioned a discount plan in which discount levels increased along with the
market-share percentage purchased from the seller. The Court found that the dis-
counts were above cost; only a single product was involved; the rival sellers offered
similar discounts; and the ease of market entry precluded anticompetitive results from
the discounting, as a new firm could enter the market and challenge the prices offered
by the dominant firm. In general, U.S. plaintiffs have not been successful in challeng-
ing incentive schemes. See FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019
(2d Cir. 1976); Western Parcel Express v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 190
F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1999); Virgin Atlantic AirwaysLimited v. British Airways plc, 257 F.3d
256 (2d Cir. 2001), and LePage's Incorporated v. 3M (Minnesota Mining and Manufac-
turing Company), 2002 WL 46961 (3d Cir. 2002). In SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and
Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978), the plaintiff was successful, but that was on the basis
of discounts that were conditional on tied sales.
10. There is no obvious analytical reason why a discount conditional on a cus-
tomer's purchasing, say, 95% of its requirements (assuming they are known to the dom-
inant company) should be treated differently from a requirement to buy exclusively to
obtain the discount. This means that there is a legitimate basis for analyzing such cases
under exclusive dealing principles.
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or some other objective reason. The Commission has also said
that any practice aimed at increasing a dominant firm's market
share may be unlawful. These statements cannot be right. Set
forth below is a synopsis of the existing law (Section A) and avail-
able defenses (Section B), followed by certain comments that
seek to clarify that law (Section C).
A. Community Law on Discounts and Rebates
Apart from predatory pricing, the Commission and Courts
have identified three main categories of discounting practices
that may be found abusive under Article 82: (1) rebates condi-
tional on exclusive purchasing; (2) loyalty rebates; and (3) target
rebates.
1. Rebates In Return For Exclusive Purchasing
Rebates granted by a dominant supplier on the condition
that a customer purchase its requirements for the relevant prod-
ucts exclusively from that supplier have generally been found
abusive.
In Suiker Unie, for example, the Court of Justice found that
the potential loss of the challenged rebate created an over-
whelming incentive for customers who would otherwise have
considered purchasing some of their needs from other suppliers
to deal with the dominant company. If a customer made one
purchase from a competitor of the dominant supplier, the cus-
tomer lost the entire rebate on all its purchases from the domi-
nant supplier over an entire year. The Court of Justice found
that this system placed customers who also bought sugar from
other sources at an unjustifiable disadvantage, enabling the
dominant supplier to "control" the amount of sugar that its cus-
tomers bought from foreign producers. Since its customers all
depended at least in part on Suiker Unie's deliveries (as custom-
ers' storage facilities were inadequate and they needed regular
supplies), the disadvantage of losing a rebate applicable to an
entire year's purchases would have outweighed any advantage
gained by buying some sugar from third parties even if such
purchases could be made at more favorable prices. No competi-
tor could sell one consignment at a price that gave the buyer a
cost saving equal to the lost rebate on a year's purchases from
the dominant supplier. As a result, the rebate gave other pro-
2002]
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ducers no chance of competing with the association, foreclosing
them from the market.1
2. Loyalty Rebates
In Hoffmann-La Roche, the Court of Justice condemned a
"loyalty" or "fidelity" rebate, that is to say "discounts conditional
on the customer's obtaining all or most of its requirements...
from the undertaking in a dominant position.' 2 Roche had of-
fered different customers different prices for identical quantities
of the same product, depending on whether or not they agreed
to limit purchases from its competitors. The Court examined
whether the system had in fact foreclosed rivals from the market
and found that it had done so:
The fact of agreeing with purchasers that they will buy all or a
very large proportion of their requirements from only one
source ... removes all freedom of choice from purchasers in
their selection of sources of supply, and ties them to one sup-
plier. The special price offered by Roche is the consideration
for the abandonment by its purchasers of their opportunities
to obtain substantial proportions of their requirements from
competitors. Should a purchaser not observe his obligation
of exclusivity - by purchasing some of his requirements from
another vitamin manufacturer - the fidelity rebate is for-
feited not only in respect of the amount of such purchase, but
in respect of all his purchases from Roche.' 3
The Court found further that this rebate system had not
evolved out of legitimate efforts by the dominant firm to in-
crease its sales, but were rather motivated by specific exclusion-
ary intent. The rebates were: "designed to deprive the pur-
chaser of or restrict his possible choices of sources of supply and
to deny other producers access to the market," "intended to give
the purchaser an incentive to obtain his supplies exclusively
from the undertaking in a dominant position," and "designed
through the grant of a financial advantage to prevent customers
from obtaining their supplies from competing producers." 4
11. See Suker Unie, [1975] E.C.R. 2001-04, paras. 502-26.
12. See Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm'n, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461, at
540, para. 89.
13. Id. at 467, para. 24. The Commission reached a similar conclusion in its deci-
sion. See Hoffman-La Roche Decision, O.J. L 258, at 514, paras. 22 and 24 (1997).
14. Id. at 540, para. 90.
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The Court followed the same line of reasoning in Irish
Sugar, where the dominant supplier's fidelity rebate was condi-
tional on the customer's purchasing "all or a large proportion"
of its retail sugar requirements from it.15 The Court found that
the rebate had foreclosed competitors from the market:
The fact that ADM [a customer] previously obtained its sup-
plies from SDL [Irish Sugar's distributor] before being can-
vassed by ASI [Irish Sugar's competitor] confirms that the
granting of that rebate . . . had the effect of tying the cus-
tomer to the supplier in a dominant position or, in other
words, of recovering a customer who was inclined to switch to
the competition.' 6
Moreover, the Court found that the rebates formed part of a
plan designed specifically to exclude Irish Sugar's competitor:
[The] approach to ADM took place in the context of a strat-
egy devised jointly by [Irish Sugar and its distributor] to pre-
vent the expansion of the Eurolux brand on the Irish retail
market by ensuring the fidelity of its customers.' 7
The Commission's decision in Soda-ash/Solvay was based on
similar reasoning. Solvay had adopted a pricing structure under
which it offered customers a standard list price on a basic con-
tractual tonnage amount (usually calculated to represent around
80% of the customer's total annual requirements), and pay-
ments and discounts for marginal purchases above the basic
amount (the "top slice," for which the customer had potential
alternative sources). The top-slice rebate was only given where
Solvay was the customer's sole or principal supplier.18 The Com-
mission found that this rebate scheme made it:
difficult or impossible for an existing or potential supplier to
enter as second supplier for the marginal tonnage, since in
order to match the substantial pecuniary advantages offered
by Solvay and obtain the order for the top 'tranche' of busi-
ness, they would have to sell at unprofitable or at 'dumping'
15. Irish Sugar plc v. Comm'n, Case T-228/97, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2969, at 11-3049,
para. 194. See also Commission Decision No. 97/624/EC, O.J. L 258/1 (1997) [herein-
after Irish Sugar Decision].
16. Irish Sugar, [1999] E.C.R. 11-3051, para. 198.
17. Id.
18. See Commission Decision No. 91/299/EEC, O.J. L 152/21, at 24, para. 16
(1991) ("Soda-ash/Solvay Decision").
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prices. 19
Solvay argued that the system was justified, since it simply repre-
sented volume discounts that depended on customers reaching
objective and pre-determined purchase thresholds. However, in
view of Solvay's position as defacto exclusive supplier to most cus-
tomers and the substantial documentary evidence that: (1) the
system was "specifically intended to ensure the loyalty of the cus-
tomer and exclude or limit competition,"2 0 and (2) the whole
purpose of the rebates was "to remove or restrict the opportunity
of other producers or suppliers of Soda-ash to compete effec-
tively with Solvay," the Commission rejected this defense. 21
3. Target Rebates
The Commission and the Community Courts have treated
certain target rebates in a similar fashion to loyalty rebates. The
leading case is Michelin, where the Court of Justice found Miche-
lin's rebates linked to annual sales targets abusive. 2 Michelin
granted rebates to tire dealers based on an annual sales target
that was established individually for each dealer on the basis of
several criteria, including the dealer's estimated sales potential
and Michelin's share of the dealer's total tire sales. The dealer
did not know the criteria that Michelin used in calculating the
target, which was not confirmed in writing but only orally by
Michelin's representative. Moreover, it was very difficult for the
dealer to ascertain how much it was earning on sales of Michelin
tires, since dealers would often not discover what their final re-
bates were until they opened the envelopes that Michelin's rep-
resentative gave them at the end of each year.23
The Court found that this system had the effect of binding
tire dealers to Michelin, restricting their effective choice of sup-
plier. Crucial to this judgment was the fact that the reference
period for the rebates was one year (i.e., if the customer
achieved the sales target, it received a retroactive discount on its
entire year's purchases from Michelin), which meant that even a
small percentage reduction in the discount rate could signifi-
19. Id. at 33, para. 52.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 36, para. 61.
22. See NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v. Comm'n, Case 322/81,
[1983] E.C.R. 3461 [hereinafter Michelin].
23. Id. at 3461, para. 28.
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cantly affect the dealer's profit margin for the whole year. This
pressured the dealer into .buying from Michelin:
[A] ny system under which. discounts are granted according to
the quantities sold during a relatively long reference period
has the inherent effect, at the end of that period, of increas-
ing pressure on the buyer to reach the purchase figure
needed to obtain the discount or to avoid suffering the ex-
pected loss for the entire period.24
Another element that the Court cited was the fact that
Michelin was much -larger than its main competitors (around
65% market share, compared to 8% for the next-largest sup-
plier). In the Court's view, Michelin's sheer size in the relevant
market made it effectively an essential trading partner for tire
dealers, who were forced to do business with Michelin. Moreo-
ver, the level of the targets on the basis of which Michelin
granted the rebates represented a significant proportion of each
dealer's total annual requirements for tires. Given this, Miche-
lin's competitors could not, by offering .discounts on their com-
paratively small sales volumes to the customer, equal the amount
of the conditional rebate from Michelin that could be lost if the
customer dealt with the competitor, to such an extent that it
would lose the Michelin rebate. Thus, dealers were reluctant to
deal with Michelin's competitors because Michelin's target re-
bates represented an important proportion of their total annual
income, they were uncertain (dealers could not be sure of meet-
ing them, even toward the end of the year),25 and the risk of not
achieving a Michelin target outweighed any possible benefit that
a smaller supplier might have offered by selling a comparatively
small amount of product even at lower prices than Michelin of-
fered. The system thus significantly restricted dealers' ability to
choose among suppliers, particularly near the end of each an-
nual reference period.
Furthermore, the Court found that Michelin's target re-
bates were "calculated to prevent dealers from being able to se-
lect freely at any time in the light of the market situation the
most favorable of the offers made by the various competitors."26
This confirmed the Commission's view that the system was
24. Id. at 3517, para. 81.
25. Id. at 3517, para. 82.
26. Id. at 3518, para. 85.
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"clearly aimed at tying the dealers closely to [Michelin] and thus
making it difficult for other producers to gain a foothold in the
market. '27 In the face of this evidence of exclusionary intent,
the Court rejected Michelin's proffered justifications for the sys-
tem. In 2001, a Michelin scheme with similar effects was con-
demned by the Commission in Michelin 11.28
Similarly, in Irish Sugar, the Court found the dominant sup-
plier's target rebate system on the retail sugar market abusive
because it foreclosed competitors. Irish Sugar's market share
was above 85% and had been for almost a decade, and there was
only one domestic competitor on the market.29 Irish Sugar had
set the reference period of the challenged target rebate (six
months) specifically to coincide with competitors' launch of new
brands on the relevant market, evidencing its exclusionary in-
tent. ° The rebates were also offered only to certain customers
of these new-entrants and target purchase levels were fixed at a
figure near to the customer's total requirements for the relevant
product. 1 The Court found that these measures effectively fore-
closed competitors from the market; in fact, one such competi-
tor went out of business only months after Irish Sugar started
implementing its rebates.12
Most recently, in Virgin/British Airways, the Commission lik-
ened the travel agent commission system employed by British
Airways ("BA") to the target rebate system condemned by the
Court of Justice in Michelin, as both were created with the inten-
tion of, and had the effect of, preventing firms from selling their
products in competition with the dominant supplier. BA's travel
agent commission system involved successively higher annual
sales commission rates for travel agents selling BA tickets as they
met various sales targets, with the targets defined as a percentage
27. Commission Decision No. 81/969/EEC, O.J. L 353/33, para. 38 (1981) [here-
inafter Michelin I Decision].
28. See Commission Decision No. 2002/405/EEC, O.J. L 143/1 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Michelin II Decision].
29. Irish Sugar, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2984, para. 23.
30. Id. at 11-3052-53, para. 203. See also Irish Sugar Decision, OJ. L 258/1, at 29,
para. 152 (1997).
31. Id. at 11-3052-53, para. 203. See also Irish Sugar Decision, OJ. L 258/1, at 29,
para. 154 (1997).
32. Irish Sugar, [1999] E.C.R. 11-3059, para. 222.
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of that agent's sales of BA tickets in the previous year." The
Commission focused on BA's significant market share (42% of
the market at the date of introduction of the rebates, compared
to 5.8% for the next-largest supplier and less than 4% each for
all others). As a result of its much larger sales base, BA could
offer travel agents large monetary rebates by giving relatively
small percentage discounts on their total annual purchases from
BA. By contrast, BA's competitors would have had to offer very
large percentage rebates on their lower sales volumes in order to
equal the rebate payments from BA.34 Because BA's target re-
bates represented an important proportion of their total annual
income, the Commission said that travel agents were reluctant to
deal with BA's competitors, since the risk of not achieving a BA
target outweighed any possible incentive that a smaller airline
might have created by making an attractive offer to sell addi-
tional flights. As in Michelin, therefore, travel agents were, ac-
cording to the Commission, left with no realistic option as to the
airline with which they dealt. The Commission also focused on
BA's intent in implementing the system, concluding that BA had
designed the rebates with the aim of foreclosing competitors:
"[BA's rebates were] intended to eliminate or at least prevent
the growth of competition to BA in the UK markets for air trans-
port."35 The decision is currently on appeal before the Court of
First Instance.
B. Defenses
A number of possible defenses or justifications for different
prices or other conditions, which might be contrary to Article 82
are available. The Court of Justice in United Brands held that a
dominant company is entitled to charge differential prices based
on a number of factors. The factors that the Court expressly
mentioned were differences in costs (e.g., transport costs, taxa-
tion, customs duties, the wages of the labor force, the differences
in the parity of currencies), and competitive conditions (market-
33. See Commission Decision No. 2000/74/EC, O.J. L 30/1, at 2, para. 3 (2000)
[hereinafter Virgin/British Airways Decision].
34. Id. at 8, para. 30. The Commission calculated that a competitor would have to
offer a discount of 17.4% on a travel agent's entire purchases from that airline in order
to compete with a BA rebate of 0.5%. Id.
35. Id. at 23, para. 118.
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ing conditions, and the density of competition).36 The Commis-
sion has also accepted price reductions for "special customer sta-
tus (e.g., [company] employees, affiliated companies, global and
multinational accounts, educational and non-profit institutions,
or government institutions").37 The list is not exhaustive but the
principal defenses are set out below.
1. Volume-Based Discounts/Economies Of Scale
The Community Courts and Commission have invariably
found standard volume rebates (e.g., offering a 10% discount to
all customers whose purchases exceed a certain threshold level)
unobjectionable. This probably reflects a number of considera-
tions. First, such a system is non-discriminatory in the sense of
Article 82 (c), since it does not result in the application of dissim-
ilar conditions to equivalent transactions. Second, in most cases,
some cost savings probably result from serving larger custom-
ers.38 Finally, the commercial reality in most industries is that
large customers expect to receive better supply terms than
smaller customers.
In Hoffmann-La Roche, the Court ofJustice held that quantity
discounts linked to customers' purchasing volume would be per-
missible.39 It found, however, that, on the facts, the price advan-
tages granted were not based on the differences in volumes
bought from Roche, but were expressly conditioned on the sup-
ply of all or a very large proportion of a customer's total require-
ments by Roche.4" Similarly, in Irish Sugar, the Court accepted
that Irish Sugar's border rebates in the retail sugar market would
have been justified if they had been related to the purchasing
volume of Irish Sugar's customers.4 1 In that case, however, the
36. See United Brands Co. and United Brands Continental B.V. v. Comm'n, Case
27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207.
37. Maurits Dolmans & Vincent Picketing, The 1997 Digital Undertaking, EUR. COM-
PETITION L. REv. 1998, 19(2), 108-15, at 113. See also id. at 114 (regarding customized or
non-standard product offerings).
38. This consideration cannot, however, be the sole justification for the positive
treatment of volume discounts. As Ridyard explains, "there is almost no plausible cost
function that would make such a discount scheme 'cost-related' in the sense that the
differences in price were explained by differences in the costs of supply." Ridyard,
supra n.4, at 289.
39. See Hoffmann-La Roche, [1979] E.C.R. 461.
40. Id. at 521, para. 22.
41. Irish Sugar, [1999] E.C.R. 11-3042, para. 173.
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rebates had been based solely on the customer's place of busi-
ness (i.e., the rebate was granted only in cases where Irish Sugar
considered that the price difference between Northern Ireland
and Ireland might have induced cross-border sales), which was
not an objective economic justification.42 Price reductions for
larger quantities have been said by the Court of Justice in Miche-
lin and Portuguese Airports to be lawful.43
Likewise, discounts or rebates that reasonably reflect antici-
pated cost savings or economies of scale have generally been re-
garded as objectively justified and hence not abusive. For exam-
ple, in October 1997, the Commission accepted an undertaking
from Digital Equipment Corporation ("Digital") concerning the
marketing and pricing of services for Digital computers that al-
lowed Digital to offer owners of Digital systems reductions from
list prices if they reflected "reasonable estimates of average cost
savings or countervailing benefits."44 In Brussels National Airport
(Zaventem), the Commission accepted that the airport authority's
discount system on landing fees charged to airlines could be jus-
tified by economies of scale, i.e., the system would not be consid-
ered abusive if the authority could show that it cost less, in terms
of administration and staff, to supply services to a carrier with a
large volume of traffic at the airport.45 More recently, the Com-
mission recognized the same principle in its Virgin/British Air-
ways decision: "a dominant supplier can give discounts that re-
late to efficiencies, for example discounts for large orders that
allow the supplier to produce large batches of product."4 6
It is not clear, however, whether the Commission considers
that quantity rebates are legal only when they are based on iden-
tifiable cost savings. If it does think that, it is hard to see what its
reasons would be. The pro-competitive importance (and the
universal use) of quantity rebates is obvious and should not de-
pend on whether the dominant firm can precisely identify corre-
sponding cost savings. More fundamentally, dominant compa-
nies with high fixed costs should be free to charge different
42. Id.
43. See Michelin, [1983] E.C.R. 3461; Portuguese Republic v. Comm'n, Case C-163/
99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-2613 [hereinafter Portuguese Airports].
44. Dolmans & Pickering, supra n.37, at 113.
45. See Commission Decision No. 95/364/EC, O.J. L 216/8 (1995) ("Brussels Na-
tional Airport/Zaventem Decision").
46. Virgin/British Airways Decision, O.J. L 30/1, at 20, para. 101 (2000).
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prices to different customers if it benefits both parties to the
lower-price transaction. Dominant companies may suffer cash
flow shortfalls in times of recession, and in such circumstances
may give price reductions, which might be primafacie contrary to
Article 82. Conversely, a dominant company may decide that a
large order is so important for stabilizing and planning its long-
term production that it should give a price reduction to obtain
it, even if it does not give rise to corresponding cost reductions.
For these and other reasons, the UK competition authority, the
Office of Fair Trading ("OFT"), recognizes that:
[p]rice discrimination between different customer groups
can be a means of (recovering common costs]; it can in-
crease output and lead to customers who might otherwise be
priced out of the market being served. In' particular, in in-
dustries with high fixed or common costs and low marginal
costs ... it may be more efficient to set higher prices to cus-
tomers with a higher willingness to pay.
4 7
In other words, fixed-cost recovery should be a defense in cases
involving price discrimination.
There is also no rule that price reductions based on cost
savings are lawful only if comparable cost savings could be made
in all other similar sales. Article 82 does not oblige the domi-
nant company to make similar cost savings if possible in other
cases, and to pass them on to other customers. It may be im-
plicit in the cost reduction defense that the price reduction cor-
responds to the amount of the cost saving. But in many cases the
price reduction is agreed before the precise extent of the cost
reduction obtainable can be known, so the price reduction must
be based on the seller's estimate of what the cost reduction will
prove to be: it cannot be criticized if that estimate turns out to
have been wrong.
2. Price Reductions In Return For Services Rendered
Price reductions may also be given in return for services
provided by the buyer, which are associated in some way with the
sale. In Michelin, the Commission stated that discounts or re-
bates were justified if provided in exchange for valuable services
performed by the customer:
47. Office of Fair Trading, Assessment of Individual Agreements and Conduct, The Com-
petition Act 1998, 8 (Sept. 1999) [hereinafter OFT 414].
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It is of course permissible, in the light of the competition
rules laid down in the EEC Treaty, for an undertaking grant-
ing discounts, bonuses, etc. to take account of the services,
which the retailer performs for the undertaking in selling its
products. A particular example might be the customer ser-
vice which the retailer may provide for final consumers and
which the manufacturer himself would otherwise have to pro-
vide.48
Similarly, in The Coca-Cola Export Corporation - Filiale Italiana, the
Commission considered rebates "conditional upon the purchase
of a series of sizes of the same product" and rebates "conditional
on the carrying out by the distributor of a particular activity (re-
arrangement and resupply of the shelves, use of advertising
materials, etc.)" to be justified by legitimate business reasons.4 9
In Irish Sugar, both the Court and the Commission con-
firmed that the rebates in that case would have been objectively
justified if they had been based on, e.g., marketing and transport
costs paid by the customer, or any promotional, warehousing,
servicing or other functions that the customer might have per-
formed. ° However, they found that the dominant supplier's of-
fer of rebates based solely on the customer's place of business as
a means of targeting border customers was not objectively justi-
fied.
3. Responding To Competitors' Prices
Price reductions that meet competitors' prices have gener-
ally been regarded as legal under Article 82. However, in the
case of certain rebate schemes calculated independently in ad-
vance by the dominant firm and largely without reference to
competing offers (e.g., target rebates), the defense of meeting
competition may be less relevant. In United Brands, the Court of
Justice made clear that a dominant undertaking must be entitled
to take such reasonable measures as it deems appropriate to pro-
48. Michelin I Decision, O.J. L 353/33, para. 45 (1981).
49. Commission Press Release IP/88/615 of October 13, 1988. See also Commis-
sion Decision No. 89/22/EEC, OJ. L 10/50 at 66 (1989) [hereinafter BPB Industries
Decision]. Where similar reasoning was used, though, in that case, it was ultimately
unsuccessful.
50. See Irish Sugar, [1999] E.C.R. 11-3042, para. 173; Irish Sugar Decision, O.J. L
258/1, para. 129 (1997).
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tect its own commercial interests, including responding to com-
petitive offers on the market in order to maintain its customers:
[t]he fact that an undertaking is in a dominant position can-
not disentitle it from protecting its own commercial interests
if they are attacked, and . . .such an undertaking must be
conceded the right to take such reasonable steps as it deems
appropriate to protect its said interests.5t
The Commission followed this reasoning, inter alia, in AKZO, 52
Hilti,53  Tetra Pak IIJ,54 BPB Industries,55 British Sugar/Napier
Brown,56 and the 1997 Digital undertaking. 57
51. United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. 293, para. 189. The Court has repeated and af-
firmed this statement on multiple occasions since. See e.g., BPB Industries plc and Brit-
ish Gypsum Ltd. v. Comm'n, Case T-65/89, [1993] E.C.R. 11-389, at 11-418, para. 69;
Tetra Pak International SA v. Comm'n, Case T-83/91, [1994] E.C.R. 11-755, at 11-826,
para. 147; and Compagnie Maritime Belge, [2000] E.C.R. 1-1472, para. 96.
52. See Commission Decision No. 83/462/EEC, O.J. L 252/20 (1983). Article 4 of
the decision provided for interim measures against AKZO, but allowed AKZO to "offer
or supply the said products at prices below [the minimum prices determined as above]
... and only if it is necessary in good faith to do so to meet (but not to undercut) a
lower price shown to be offered by another supplier ready and able to supply... to that
undertaking." See also AKZO v. Comm'n, Case C-62/86, [1991] E.C.R. 1-3359, at 1-3475,
para. 156. AKZO had threatened ECS that it would exclude it from the market unless it
withdrew from competing in certain end-uses. AKZO then circumvented the interim
measures ordered by the Commission and sold below average variable cost with preda-
tory intent. Prices charged by AKZO were "well below" those of its competitors, show-
ing that AKZO's intention "was not solely to win the order, which would have induced it
to reduce its prices only to the extent necessary for this purpose." Id., at 1-3463, para.
102.
53. See Commission Decision No. 88/138/EEC, O.J. L 65/19 (1988) [hereinafter
Hilti Decision]. Hilti was obliged to cease all price discrimination by ensuring that any
differences in its prices were justified by differences in costs, except where it was neces-
sary to depart from this in order to meet a competitive offer, in making promotions, or
where to do so would generate sales that Hilti would not otherwise make.
54. See Commission Decision No. 92/163/EEC, O.J. L 72/1 (1992) [hereinafter
Tetra Pak II Decision]. The argument that Tetra Pak was merely meeting competition
was recognized but rejected on factual grounds.
55. See BPB Industries Decision, O.J. L 10/50, para. 134 (1989). The Commission
accepted BPB's "Super Schedule A" prices because they were neither predatory nor
part of any scheme of systematic alignment.
56. See Napier Brown & Co. Ltd. v. British Sugar PLC, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 196, para.
31. The Commission suggested that while undercutting a competitor's prices would be
abusive, matching them would not.
57. The Commission recognized that even allegedly dominant companies must be
allowed to offer price reductions (called "Allowances") in individual cases "to meet
comparable service offerings of a competitor. No Allowance shall be offered until Digi-
tal has completed an internal review process designed to verify that the proposed Allow-
ance is offered in good faith as a proportional response to real or (based upon informa-
tion from the customer or other reliable sources) reasonably anticipated competitive
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However, in Irish Sugar and Compagnie Maritime Belge, the
Court, on the facts, disallowed "meeting competition" as a de-
fense, even if it accepted that in principle it could be a defense."
Those cases suggest that discounting that "selectively and system-
atically" matches competitors' bids may be abusive.59 These
cases should, however, be explained on the basis that the prices
were combined with other exclusionary behavior, which, as ex-
plained in Part IV, distinguishes these cases from instances of a
single abuse. Irish Sugar used a range of rebate and illicit com-
mercial practices (e.g., product swaps) to insulate the Irish mar-
ket from the incidence of imports from other Member States. In
Compagnie Maritime Beige, there were also other abuses (exclusive
contracts and 100% loyalty rebates). The CEWAL liner confer-
ence's behavior was also admittedly intended to eliminate its
only competitor and the conference members engaged in loss
sharing among themselves for this purpose.
How far Article 82 is intended to protect competitors, and
how far it should be interpreted to limit the extent to which
dominant companies can compete, are fundamental issues. It is
obvious that even dominant companies may compete, and
should be encouraged to do so. If one customer can get a com-
petitor to offer a low price, other similarly situated customers
should be able to do so too, and matching that price is not likely
to create a competitive disadvantage. It is also clear that any in-
terpretation, which discourages a dominant company from low-
ering its price, even in one individual transaction, should be
looked at very critically. Low -prices for some sales are better
than no low prices at all. It now seems (though it is not clear)
from Compagnie Maritime Belge that a dominant company may un-
dercut, as well as meet, a competitor's price, provided that the
effect of its practices is not to eliminate the only competitor, and
provided that predatory prices are avoided.
offerings and will not result in a foreclosure or distortion of competition for the servic-
ing of Digital systems in any Member State." Dolmans & Pickering, supra n.37, at 113-
14.
58. For example, in Irish Sugar, the Court of First Instance stated that "[t]here is
no doubt that a firm in a dominant position is entitled to defend that position by com-
peting with other firms on its market." Irish Sugar Decision, O.J. L 258/1, at 22, para.
134 (1997).
59. See e.g., Philip Andrews, Is Meeting Competition a Defense to Predatory Pricing? - The
Irish Sugar Decision Suggests a New Approach, EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 1998, 19(1), 49-
57.
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A more difficult question is whether undercutting a compet-
itor's price is a defense where Article 82(c) would otherwise be
infringed (again assuming the price is not predatory). The ques-
tion would arise if the two companies were bidding for a long-
term contract for a substantial quantity, so that if the dominant
company offered a specially low price to meet or undercut its
rival's, it would create a disadvantage for its other customers, un-
less it reduced its price to them also (assuming that the transac-
tions were similar). However, were a dominant company pre-
vented from undercutting a competitor's price in that situation,
not only would the dominant company be discouraged from
competing, but its rival would have the benefit of a "price um-
brella." The rival would know (if prices were transparent or the
customer was reliable) that the dominant company could not
undercut its price without extending the same reduction to all
its other customers, at least in "similar" transactions. The rival
would therefore know that it need not undercut the dominant
company's standard price by very much or at all. The customer
will also have an interest in claiming that a rival is offering a
lower price, with the result that the lawfulness of a dominant
company's price would depend to some extent on the cus-
tomer's truthfulness. It is also likely that a dominant company
will find itself competing against two rivals whose prices are un-
likely to be identical. In these circumstances it may match the
lower price, but this means that it undercuts the higher of the
two rivals' prices. It would be nonsense to say that it was acting
lawfully if the buyer was planning to take the lower price offer,
but acting unlawfully if it planned to take the higher of the two
offers. In other words, a rule that limited a dominant to meeting
competitive offers could itself lead to anticompetitive and per-
verse results. It could also lead to companies' verifying each
other's prices, which could give rise to serious issues under Arti-
cle 81 of the EC Treaty.
There are also likely to be wider benefits to a rule that al-
lowed a dominant firm to meet and undercut rivals' prices. If
the dominant company was free to meet or undercut its rival's
price in one transaction, it presumably would have to do the
same thing again when its rival offered the same low price to
other buyers, with the result that the general price level should
come down. The better view therefore is that a dominant com-
pany may either meet or undercut a rival's price even when that
[Vol. 26:83
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would be likely to create a competitive disadvantage for its other
customers, since (if the rival remains in the market) the disad-
vantage is not likely to be a lasting one. This is also consistent
with the Commission's increasing insistence that the purpose of
Community competition law is to protect consumers and compe-
tition, not to protect competitors.
4. New Products And New Markets
Price reductions given by the dominant enterprise when it is
launching a new product or entering a new market should also
be lawful.6 ° These practices are not designed solely to exclude
competitors or to differentiate between customers, but consti-
tute normal competition "on the merits." One apparent diffi-
culty with this is that if a price reduction is lawful when entering
a new market, should it not be lawful when selling to a new cus-
tomer of the dominant enterprise? The answer seems to be that
selling to a new customer in the same -market, although pro-com-
petitive, might create the kind of competitive disadvantage be-
tween customers that Article 82 was, wisely or unwisely, intended
to prevent. Selling in a new market, whether a new geographical
market or a new product market, will not create a disadvantage
as between competing customers of the dominant company, as
long as the markets are genuinely separate. Also, if a dominant
company enters a new market, it is creating additional competi-
tion in that market, and this should be encouraged, particularly
as economic integration is one of the objectives of the EU.
Although the issues do not seem to have arisen formally in
any Commission case, it should be a defense to show that the
lower price was given because the dominant company's goods
were obsolete or perishable. It should also be a defense to show
that the dominant company's price reduction was necessary to
help the buyer respond to competition or enter a new market, or
for some other pro-competitive reason. It should also be a de-
fense to show that the product specification in the transaction,
although similar to that in other sales, is unique, or that the
transaction is one in which the buyer will be reselling under the
60. See e.g., Dolmans & Pickering, supra n.37. The 1997 undertaking by Digital
Equipment Corporation ("Digital"), allowed Digital to grant price reductions for "short-
term promotional programs" provided that these are published, available on a non-
discriminatory basis, and do not result in below-cost pricing. Id. at 113.
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seller's label rather than its own, because this means that the
transactions are not "similar" to other transactions. In many
cases, several of these defenses will be available simultaneously.
C. Other Comments
1. Recent Commission Statements On Discounting
In the context of the above-mentioned cases, the Commis-
sion has made certain statements on rebate practices that would
be extremely troubling if they were understood to represent the
general state of the law on discounting. In Virgin/British Airways,
the Commission summarized Community competition law on
discounts as follows:
Community competition law limits the type of discount
scheme that can be operated by a dominant firm. Discount
schemes that are quite legitimate, and a normal part or busi-
ness activity when practised by a non-dominant firm can be
abusive when practised by a dominant firm. However it is
clear from the Hoffmann-La Roche case that a dominant firm
cannot enter into an agreement with a customer where the
customer agrees to obtain all or most of their requirements
for a product from that dominant supplier. The same case
also indicates that a dominant supplier cannot operate a discount
scheme which has an equivalent effect to an agreement that a cus-
tomer obtain all or part of its requirements from a dominant sup-
plier.6
1
But any generous discount may have an "effect" equivalent to
such an agreement: the customer may find no better bargains,
and buy only from that supplier. Any agreement by which any-
one buys anything is an agreement to buy "part" of its require-
ments of that product or service. A little later, the Commission
tries to use a clearer formula:
[A] dominant supplier.., cannot give discounts or incentives
to encourage loyalty, that is for avoiding purchases from a
competitor of the dominant supplier . .. [A] dominant sup-
plier can only give rebates in return for efficiencies realized
and not in return for loyalty, that is for avoiding purchases
from a competing supplier.62
61. Virgin/British Airways Decision, O.J. L 30/1, at 20, para. 97 (2000) (emphasis
added).
62. Id. at 20-21, para. 101.
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This statement is also unhelpful, since it assumes that efficien-
cies and exclusivity are the only two possible reasons why a domi-
nant firm would offer a discount. Rebates may be granted for all
sorts of reasons, including customer buyer power and historical
reasons. All discounts are meant to encourage the buyer to buy
more and there is no reason why, absent some unlawful element,
that circumstance is objectionable from an antitrust perspective.
More fundamentally, the objection to loyalty discounts is not
that they lead to a customer's not taking some products from a
competitor, but that the conditions on which the dominant firm
grants a discount are equivalent to anticompetitive exclusive
purchasing requirements.
Similar statements were made in Michelin I. The Commis-
sion said:
In the first Michelin case... and consistently in more recent
cases, the Court of Justice has ruled against the granting of
quantity rebates by an undertaking in a dominant position
where the rebates exceed a reasonable period of three
months (as is the case here) on the grounds that such a prac-
tice is not in line with normal competition based on prices.
Merely buying a small additional quantity of Michelin prod-
ucts made the dealer eligible for a rebate on the whole of the
turnover achieved with Michelin and this was greater than the
fair marginal or linear return on the additional purchase,
which clearly creates a strong buying incentive effect.63
While this is not very clear, and it certainly does not offer readers
a useful indication of what may and may not be legally permissi-
ble, it is not plainly wrong. But the Commission went on: "In
the Court's view, a rebate can only correspond to the economies
of scale achieved by a firm as a result of the additional purchases
which consumers are induced to make. 64 In other words, the
Commission seems to think that identifiable cost-savings are the
only legitimate justification for discounting practices.65
Michelin II also contains other troubling statements. First,
63. Michelin II Decision, O.J. L 143/1 at 34, para. 216 (2002). Similarly, there are
extremely troubling statements in British Gypsum, Commission Regulation No. 46/99
O.J. L 10/1 (1999) which suggest that any rebate aimed at increasing a dominant com-
pany's market share is or is likely to be unlawful. See also BPB Industries, [1993] E.C.R.
II-389.
64. Michelin II Decision, 0.J. L 143/1 at 34-35, para. 216 (2002).
65. See Portuguese Airports, [2001] E.C.R. 1-2613, where the Commission stated that
discounts offered by a dominant firm "must, however, be justified on objective grounds,
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the Commission appears to have set itself an extremely low stan-
dard for assessing the materiality of foreclosure. The Commis-
sion stated that a total rebate of 150 FFR (approximately $22)
based on overall purchases of 15,000 FFR (approximately
$2,200) is "clearly quite substantial."66 Further, the Commission
came very close to saying that any commercial practice by a dom-
inant firm aimed at increasing market share may be unlawful
under Article 82 when it stated that "an undertaking in a domi-
nant position cannot require dealers to exceed, each year, their
figures for the previous years and thus automatically increase its
market share."67
Thus, read in isolation, and in the absence of a clear analyti-
cal framework, the Commission's statements would lead a rea-
sonable reader to believe that: (1) the use of certain target and
loyalty rebates by a dominant firm is per se illegal; (2) discounts
practised by a dominant firm must be justified by specific cost-
savings or economies of scale;6" (3) any discount that makes it
rational for a customer to purchase all or even part of its require-
ments from a dominant firm may be unlawful; and (4) discounts
that have the effect of increasing the dominant firm's market
share may be unlawful.
These statements have no economic basis and do not accu-
rately paraphrase the case law of the Community Courts. Hoff-
mann-La Roche was concerned with express exclusivity contracts,
or contracts that required the customer to purchase nearly all of
its requirements from Hoffmann-La Roche in order to get the
discount.6 9 Michelin I was also concerned with rebates which
were designed to lead to exclusivity and with the lack of trans-
parency of the conditions that would attract the largest dis-
that is to say, they should enable the undertaking in question to make economies of
scale." Id. para. 49.
66. Michelin II Decision, O.J. L 143/1, at 36, para. 231 (2002).
67. Id. at 40, para. 263.
68. As Ridyard notes, this statement is particularly worrying:
A per se prohibition on price discrimination - i.e., a requirement that domi-
nant firms should earn equal price-cost mark-ups on all their transactions -
would be unduly restrictive and almost certainly lead to grossly inefficient out-
comes in the context of fixed cost recovery industries. It would, for example,
have the bizarre impact of outlawing the standard volume discount schemes
operated by many dominant firms and which are generally deemed to be un-
exceptionable in competition law terms.
Ridyard, supra n.4, at 291.
69. See Hoffman-La Roche, [1979] E.C.R. 53940, para. 89.
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count.70 In other words, the passages from these judgments re-
lied upon by the Commission were only concerned with the
question of how far cost reductions could justify the discounts in
the cases before it, which were designed to lead to exclusive buy-
ing. Any wider interpretation takes the passages out of their con-
text. It also disregards the only plausible antitrust objection to
pricing that, after all, remains above cost: the discount is only
granted in return for exclusive or near-exclusive purchasing.
There is no wider principle that a dominant company cannot
give a discount unless linked to clear cost savings or some other
efficiency.
2. A Framework For Analyzing Community Competition
Law On Discounting
Given the confusion that may have been created by certain
Commission statements, it seems useful to restate that there
should be no per se rules against pricing practices. If anything,
lower prices that remain above cost should in nearly all cases be
presumed legal and efficiency-enhancing. In regard to those
pricing practices that have been reviewed by the Commission in
the past, several situations should be distinguished:
" A discount conditional on the customer's buying all of its
requirements from the dominant firm will usually be un-
lawful. However, in some cases, a discount in return for
exclusivity may be legal where the dominant company is
making a substantial investment in additional capacity
that is economic only if the buyer commits to buying all
its requirements from the dominant company for long
enough to make the investment profitable.71
* A dominant company should be free to grant quantity re-
bates for all of its customers if that rebate is not predatory
or conditional on that customer's not buying from third
parties. This is simply a favorable list price, not individu-
ally negotiated. There is no need to show specific cost-
savings or efficiencies related to that rebate. If quantity
discounts are available, and in most industries they are,
70. See Michelin, [1983] E.C.R. 3461, para. 38.
71. In this respect the Court's findings in BPB and British Gypsum (Case T-65/89
[1993] ECR II 389, para. 68; and Case 310/93P, [1995] ECR 1 865, para. 34) that it is
not a defense that the buyer proposed an exclusive contract, while understandable,
risks discouraging legitimate competition.
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most buyers try to take advantage of them, and the best
way to do that is to contract for a maximum achievable
quantity. Discouraging quantity rebates would harm cus-
tomers as well as competition. An unbeatable price may
put a competitor out of the market or cause a customer to
buy only from the supplier which offers it, but, in the ab-
sence of predation or an anti-competitive condition at-
tached to getting the discount, that is legitimate competi-
tion.
* A dominant company can grant a discount on the addi-
tional purchases above a certain quantity or target thresh-
old; this is simply a pro-competitive price reduction, and
the buyer would be free to buy the additional quantity
from any other supplier which offered a more favorable
price for that quantity. This is true whether or not the
quantity is individually negotiated. Again, there is no
need to show identifiable cost-savings or efficiencies.
" A price reduction given on a buyer's purchases from a
dominant supplier in a given period, which is granted
only on the condition that the total quantity exceeds a tar-
get figure should usually be regarded as pro-competitive.
This conclusion applies even if the quantity is individually
negotiated, and even if the buyer has a strong incentive to
buy most of its requirements from the dominant company
to make sure that he gets the price reduction. However, a
price reduction based on one or more individually-negoti-
ated quantities may be illegal if it is structured in such a
way that it creates a very strong incentive for the customer
to buy all or nearly all of its total requirements from the
dominant firm, whatever they may prove to be. Whether
the loss of a cumulative rebate will in practice lead to ex-
clusive or near-exclusive purchasing is highly fact-specific.
In some cases, the scope for foreclosure may be more ob-
vious," but it will generally be necessary to consider sev-
72. Consider a situation where a customer has annual requirements of ten units
for a product and the dominant firm's list price is $10 per unit. Assume further that
the dominant firm has a stable market share of 70% in the relevant market and benefits
from a strong brand or is an essential trading party in some respect, with the result that
the customer has reasonably inelastic demand for seven units supplied by the dominant
firm. However. the dominant firm proposes a rebate to the customer whereby any
purchases in excess of seven units will attract a discount of 5% not only on the addi-
tional sales but also on all units purchased by the customer from the dominant firm
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riod, so that the buyer was uncertain whether it had
been reached or not (i.e., transparency).
III. DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN CUSTOMERS
(ARTICLE 82(C))
A. The Case Law
There have been a number of cases dealing with secondary-
line discrimination in Community competition law. Although,
under the wording of Article 82(c), the emphasis is on prevent-
ing distortion of competition on a downstream market between
customers, there is relatively little analysis in the case law of what
constitutes a meaningful competitive disadvantage between cus-
tomers.
In United Brands, the Court found that the dominant com-
pany had discriminated unlawfully between wholesaler banana
ripeners. 4 It had sold the same bananas at the same Commu-
nity ports at different prices to different wholesaler ripeners op-
erating in different Member States, on the basis of the retail
prices in each State. It was able to do this because it prohibited
the wholesalers from selling unripened bananas, thereby effec-
tively preventing arbitrage and re-exports. Once ripe, bananas
are so fragile and perishable that no trade is possible, except
immediate delivery to nearby retailers. In other words, the
wholesaler ripeners would have been in competition with one
another (and the price differences would have been large
enough to create a competitive disadvantage) if United Brands
had not also restricted competition by the clause prohibiting re-
sale of unripened bananas. The Court confirmed that Article 82
does not prevent a dominant enterprise from setting different
prices in different Member States, in particular where the price
differences are justified by differences in the marketing condi-
tions and in the intensity of competition. However, it may not
apply "artificial" price differences, in the context of artificial par-
titioning of national markets. By "artificial" the Court appar-
ently meant measures that are linked to practices that restrict
competition, and are not based on pro-competitive reasons such
as, for example, the need to maintain quality.
In British Leyland, the dominant enterprise had charged a
74. See United Brands, [19781 E.C.R. 207.
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higher fee for certificates of conformity with national technical
requirements for left-hand drive cars than for certificates for oth-
erwise identical right-hand drive cars, to discourage imports of
left-hand drive vehicles.75 The Commission said this practice was
discriminatory, and this was not seriously contested in the Court
of Justice. Interestingly, the price difference primarily affected
users, who were not normally in competition with one another,
rather than the dealers selling the cars. The answer presumably
was that the difference affected competition between dealers in
different States, insofar as they were supplying to buyers resident
in Belgium.
In Deutsche Bahn, the Court found that DB's conduct had
contributed directly to maintaining a difference between the
transport rate per kilometer to German and non-German
ports.7 6 There was a protective system of tariffs for carriage by
rail passing through the northern (German) ports. This created
a disadvantage for companies operating on the non-German rail
journeys. Differences in the underlying costs were in part due to
DB itself: cost savings had been achieved only for the northern
ports, although there was no reason why they could not have
been achieved on the western routes. As competition was more
intense on the routes with the higher tariffs, competitive pres-
sure could not explain the price differences. (This case can also
be regarded as discrimination by a vertically-integrated domi-
nant enterprise in favor of its own operations).
In Agroports de Paris, the airports had charged different fees
to companies providing certain ground services.77 The Court
said that this practice was comparable to that in Corsica Ferries,
where the dominant enterprise had charged different prices to
customers operating on domestic and international routes.7"
The concessionaire's turnover is an appropriate criterion by
which to determine the variable part of the overall fee, but that
criterion must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner to all
groundhandlers. There was no justification for distinguishing
75. See British Leyland Public Ltd Co. v. Comm'n, Case 226/84, [1986] E.C.R.
3263.
76. See Deutsche Bahn AG v. Comm'n, Case T-229/94, [1997] E.C.R. 11-01689.
77. See Aroports de Paris v. Comm'n, Case T-128/98, [2000] E.C.R. 11-3929.
78. See Corsica Ferries Italia Sri v. Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova, Case C-18/
93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1783.
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eral elements in order to decide whether material foreclo-
sure is probable. In reviewing each of these elements,
market context (e.g., existence of countervailing power),
established market practice (e.g., whether competitors of-
fer similar schemes), and any efficiencies generated by
the discount scheme are important to bear in mind.
1. The size of the discount. The larger the discount, the
greater the incentive to purchase only from the domi-
nant firm;
2. Whether the discount increases in a linear manner,
or in steps, and if so what the quantity is for each step.
A large increase in the level of the discount for addi-
tional purchases above the relevant target will create
much greater marginal incentives;
3. The structure of market demand. If demand is more
or less finite, cumulative discounts will tend to have a
share-stealing effect and may therefore have a direct
impact on opportunities for competitors. In contrast,
if demand is growing significantly or there is consid-
erable market opportunity for the product in ques-
tion, a cumulative discount will tend to have a market-
growing effect and will therefore be less liable to fore-
close competitors;
4. The length of the reference period. Generally, the
longer it is, the greater the cumulative effect of the
discount will be in absolute terms. In Michelin I, the
Court of Justice struck down a one year reference pe-
riod. In Coca-Cola/San Pellegrino, the Commission ac-
cepted that rebates awarded on the basis of perform-
ance over a period of not more than three months
would not be abusive.73 In Virgin/British Airways, the
during the year. The result is that the dominant company's effective price for the
eighth unit is $6, which means that the rival will in most cases incur a loss in order to
make that sale. These marginal incentives increase as the customer moves closer to the
end of the reference period. In many cases, the dominant's company's effective price
for the additional unit(s) will also be predatory, but that is not the objection. The
objection is that the customer would have to buy exclusively or almost exclusively from
the dominant firm in order to obtain any discount, which has the same effect as if it
(unlawfully) agreed not to buy from a competitor.
73. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINETEENTH REPORT ON COM-
PETITION POLICY 1989, at 65, para. 50 (1990). The same position was taken by the Ger-
man Federal Cartel Office (Kammergericht - Kart 32779 Fertigfutter, Deutsche
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Commission indicated in its press release that a six-
month reference period might be acceptable. The
upshot of these cases is that there is no general rule
beyond the fact that a longer period will tend to lead
to greater exclusion. Whether it does in practice is a
question of fact that will also depend on other factors
listed here;
5. Whether the buyer must buy some of its requirements
from the dominant company, because there is no
other supplier (in which case it is sure to acquire a
cumulative rebate, which is sure to influence it), or
whether it could buy all its needs from competitors if
it chose. If a customer must buy a large number of
units from the dominant firm, the effect of the cumu-
lative rebate on sales above this fixed level is more
likely to cause foreclosure. Stability of demand of the
dominant firm's market share and a strong brand
may also be relevant. A company with a stable and
high market share and a strong brand is as a matter of
probability more likely to cause foreclosure by cumu-
lative rebates;
6. The proportion of the total market subject to the
price reduction;
7. Whether the total quantity which the buyer would
buy could be estimated in advance, or could be in-
creased significantly if the buyer marketed actively
enough (in the latter case, a target quantity is a legiti-
mate incentive to effort);
8. Whether the quantity was known by both parties to
correspond closely to the buyer's total requirements
during the reference period;
9. Whether the quantity is higher than the buyer's
purchases or sales of the seller's product in the previ-
ous period, without any corresponding increase in to-
tal demand, especially if this occurs in several periods
in succession; and
10. Whether the quantity that would give rise to the price
reduction was not disclosed during the reference pe-




between companies doing their own groundhandling and com-
panies providing groundhandling for third parties.
The Portuguese Airports landing charges case concerned dis-
counts that were granted on the basis of the number of landings
made.79 The Commission accepted that an enterprise in a domi-
nant position is entitled to give quantity discounts. The Court
added, quoting Michelin, that a dominant enterprise may offer
quantity discounts linked solely to the volumes of purchases
made from it. The Court therefore ignored, rather than clearly
rejected, the Commission's argument that quantity discounts
need to be objectively justified by economies of scale. As a result
of the thresholds of the various discount bands, and the levels of
discount offered, discounts were enjoyed only by a few particu-
larly large companies, and the absence of linear progression in
the increase of the discount was evidence of discrimination. 0
The biggest increases in the discount were given for the highest
bands, which were obtainable only by the two Portuguese air-
lines. No objective justification or explanation was provided.
Similarly, the Court referred to the Corsica Ferries case and said
that different landing charges for domestic and international
flights were discriminatory. The discrimination resulted from
the application of a different tariff system for the same number
of landings of aircraft of the same type.8
There are also a number of cases concerning rebate and
discounting practices under Article 82 where the Commission
and Community Courts alluded to the possible existence of dis-
crimination between customers. However, in our view, these
cases were primarily concerned with exclusionary behavior
against competitors than discrimination between customers.
The cases include Irish Sugar and Virgin/British Airways.12 (The
79. See Portuguese Airports, [2001] E.C.R. 1-2613.
80. The Court was careful to point out, however, that "the mere fact that the result
of quantity discounts is that some customers enjoy in respect of specific quantities a
proportionally higher average reduction than others-in relation to the difference in
their respective volumes of purchase is inherent in this type of system, but it cannot be
inferred from that alone that the system is discriminatory." Id. para. 51. In other
words, it accepted that bigger customers get better bargains and that this circumstance
does not of itself infringe Article 82(c).
81. See also Commission Decision No. 99/198/EEC, O.J. L 69/24 (1999) ("Finnish
Airports Decision") (where similar issues arose).
82. See Virgin/British Airways Decision, O.J. L 30/1 (2000). This case is currently
under appeal.
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Commission's discrimination finding in Michelin was rejected by
the Court of Justice.) For example, Irish Sugar offered low
prices to customers depending on whether they were situated at
border areas exposed to competition from imports or not. The
Court of First Instance held that these discounts were discrimina-
tory but did not explain how the customers competed with each
other or how they would have been disadvantaged by the dis-
count:
They [the border rebates] were given to certain customers in
the retail sugar market by reference solely to their exposure
to competition resulting from cheap imports from another
Member State and, in this case, by reference to their being
established along the border with Northern Ireland. [B]y the
applicant's own admission, its economic capacity to offer re-
bates in the region along the border with Northern Ireland
depended on the stability of its prices in other regions, which
amounts to recognition that it financed those rebates by
means of its sales in the rest of Irish territory. By conducting
itself in that way, the applicant abused its dominant position
in the retail sugar market in Ireland, by preventing the devel-
opment of free competition on that market and distorting its
structures, in relation to both purchasers and consumers.
The latter were not able to benefit, outside the region along
the border with Northern Ireland, from the price reductions
caused by the imports of sugar from Northern Ireland. 3
Similarly, in Virgin/British Airways, the Commission stated that
BA's rebate system discriminated between travel agents by grant-
ing agents selling a smaller number of tickets a proportionately
higher rebate that those selling a large number of tickets. The
Commission found that this rebate distorted competition be-
tween travel agents without explaining how that distortion was
material:
The effect of these discriminatory commissions will be to
place certain travel agents at a competitive disadvantage rela-
tive to each other. Travel agents must compete with each
other to provide agency services to the public and to per-
suade members of the public to book air tickets through
them. The resources available to the travel agents to do this
by, for example, promoting their services to the public or by
splitting commission with travelers, come from their commis-
83. Irish Sugar, [1999] E.C.R. 11-3047-48, para. 188.
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sion income. By distorting the level of commission income
earned by travel agents these schemes will affect the ability of
travel agents to compete with each other.8 4
B. Comments
From the foregoing, it should be clear that Article 82(c) (or
secondary line injury) plays a limited role in Community compe-
tition law. There are several reasons for this. First, the legal
standard requires proof that the discriminated party has suffered
a competitive disadvantage, that is price differences must have
caused a material competitive handicap. At a minimum, this
must mean that the discriminated customers have no readily-
available alternative; customers compete with each other on a
downstream market; the product in question is an important in-
put cost for a downstream market either because it is resold at
the retail level unchanged or it represents a significant percent-
age of the total cost of a derivative product; and the price differ-
ence is large enough to place the discriminated customers at an
appreciable competitive disadvantage. There are not many situ-
ations in which all of those conditions would be met. If these
conditions are not met, a dominant company does not otherwise
have to explain differences in its prices.
Second, in any industry in which the products or services
are adapted to the needs of customers, transactions are rarely
sufficiently "similar" for Article 82(c) to apply. Many products
are individually designed and produced by companies and there
will often be reasons for objective differences between customers
and between individual customer's orders.
Third, the circumstances in which Article 82(c) applies are
inherently limited. If there is a possibility of arbitrage, a domi-
nant company will not be able to charge its customers signifi-
cantly different prices for the same or similar products. Even if
there is no such possibility, the customers may protest and refuse
to pay the higher price. In Europe, many companies sell at dif-
ferent prices to buyers in different Member States. Provided
that the seller has done nothing to keep national markets sepa-
rate, these price differences are usually lawful, for one or more
of the reasons mentioned here.
84. Id. at 11-3021, para. 111.
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Finally, even if all of the conditions for showing competitive
disadvantage are met, the defenses available under Article 82
outlined in the preceding section will in most instances justify
the difference in price.
All of this makes sense. There is not - nor should there be
- a rule of Community competition law that obliges a dominant
company to offer all its customers a lower price if it offers a
lower price to one of them. The EC Treaty does not require the
same price to be offered to all customers. Particularly in an in-
dustry with high fixed costs and low marginal costs, differential
pricing is a normal means of fixed-cost recovery, and should not
be criticized. A strict non-discrimination rule would be anticom-
petitive and extremely inconvenient. A strict rule would mean
that, if a dominant enterprise wanted to lower its price in a nego-
tiation, it would have to consider whether it could lower its price
in every comparable transaction. There would have to be a rule
stating whether a dominant company that lowered its price had
to give the reduction retroactively in contracts it had already en-
tered into, or only in subsequent contracts. There would have to
be a rule stating how long the enterprise would have to continue
to charge the same price before it could raise its price again. It
is obvious that companies do not do this, and that price competi-
tion would be very seriously discouraged if they were expected
to.
In practice, this means that the principal situation in which
the non-discrimination principle would be applicable and none
of the valid defenses would likely be available concerns discrimi-
nation by a State-owned company between domestic and foreign
companies for protectionist reasons. Several of the cases dis-
cussed above involve State-owned companies charging more
favorable prices to companies of the same State, to companies
selling products produced in the same State, or to companies
flying on domestic as distinct from international routes. In each
case, although there was no express discrimination on the
grounds of nationality, it became clear that the purpose and ef-
fect was protectionist. However, it is not easy to visualize a situa-
tion in which a company that was not State-owned would have an
interest in charging significantly different prices in genuinely
similar transactions to customers that were in competition with
one another. If this occurred, it would normally be because the
buyers getting the lower price were starting up or were less able
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or less willing to pay for some reason, and the seller believed that
it could only make sales to them at a lower price. In other
words, discrimination is relevant primarily in cases of concealed
discrimination on the grounds of nationality.
IV. PREDATORY PRICING
A. Introduction and Overview
Predatory pricing involves pricing below some measure of
cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors or deterring en-
try by potential rivals in the short-run, thereby reducing competi-
tion through higher prices in the long run. In contrast to price
cutting aimed at increasing or maintaining market share, preda-
tory pricing has a different objective: causing the exit of rivals or
ensuring that potential rivals would in the future be deterred
from entering or from competing aggressively for fear of being
pushed out of the market by strategic, below-cost price cuts. In
either case, the explanation is that successful predation would
allow the dominant firm to increase prices to above-competitive
levels in the long run. We consider below the current approach
to below-cost selling under Community competition law.
There has also been some discussion among economists
whether predation can be successful where the dominant firm
does not price below its costs but formulates a plan of strategic
price-cutting to eliminate a rival. Indeed, as will be seen below,
there is a much larger number of cases in Community competi-
tion law that have treated pricing above both average variable
and average total cost as exclusionary than cases of pricing below
average variable cost. Whether above-cost pricing can be exclu-
sionary or should be treated as unlawful under antitrust law
raises very difficult issues. On the one hand, there is a considera-
ble body of economic and legal thinking that price-cutting on
these lines is not an antitrust violation. If prices remain above
cost, a company cannot otherwise complain that the price is too
low, since it should be. able to compete on the basis of such a
price by achieving the same level of efficiency as the dominant
firm. If a company cannot achieve equal or better efficiency, an-
titrust law should not offer it a safe haven or allow it to maintain
unreasonably high prices. On the other hand, some economists
argue that excluding rivals on the basis of above-cost pricing may
lead to anti-competitive results if that exclusion is more or less
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permanent and allows the dominant firm to raise prices post-
exit. This applies particularly where entry barriers or re-entry
costs are high or the dominant firm is active in several markets
and acquires a reputation for taking drastic action against new
entrants in one of its markets. We also consider this category of
potentially exclusionary pricing. 5
Any set of rules that deal with predatory pricing must ad-
dress two fundamental questions: (1) What economic model do
you apply to determine whether price-cutting can give rise to
predation? (2) What legal rules should govern the application of
the underlying economic model to determine whether the price-
cutting in question is unlawful? In deciding which economic
model and legal rules should apply, there is an even more im-
portant (and sometimes difficult to reconcile) underlying objec-
tive. The underlying objective is, on the one hand, to ensure
that the chosen approach does not allow predatory behavior to
go undetected, and, on the other hand, to allow firms to com-
pete on price to the widest possible extent. In addition, enforce-
ment of whatever approach chosen must not be complicated,
since a complex rule that is costly to enforce can create enforce-
ment and welfare costs of its own. It should also be borne in
mind that perfect information will almost never be available in
the context of litigation or administrative action. In other
words, the optimal rule may never be properly applied, which
will also have welfare implications.
There are several possible approaches to predatory pricing
under antitrust law. However, even if there is agreement that
predatory pricing may be profitable and anti-competitive, no
one rule could possibly capture all the situations in which that
would occur, still less gain universal acceptance:
° No RULE. A small number of economists and lawyers con-
sider that no distinct rules are required to deal with pred-
atory pricing." The argument runs as follows. To suc-
85. Predatory conduct may also occur on the basis of non-price factors, such as
vexatious litigation or some other form of behavior designed to raises rivals' costs or
cause them artificial competitive handicaps. These actions are no less serious than
predatory pricing and may, in fact, be more serious given that they may be less costly to
pursue; not easily detected; and are not yet governed by clear legal rules. These are
not, however, discussed further in this Article.
86. The leading advocate of such an approach is Robert H. Bork. See ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 145 (1978).
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cessfully engage in predation, a firm must forego the
(higher) profits that free competition would bring in or-
der to later recoup monopoly profits that would exceed
the losses incurred. It must also be probable that there
are sufficient barriers to re-entry or new entry to ensure
that the monopoly profits can be maintained: prices at
above-competitive levels will usually attract entry. Absent
these elements, predatory pricing would be irrational. In
other words, predatory pricing is by nature speculative
and in practice unlikely. Even if there is agreement that
predatory pricing cases are relatively rare, this theory has
not gained widespread acceptance.
COST-BASED RULES. The concept implicit in predatory
pricing is that the price charged is below some measure of
cost. This has led a number of economists to argue that
rules based on the identification of prices that are above/
below cost are appropriate to prevent predatory pricing.
The classic model used in this connection is the Areeda &
Turner test developed in the 1970s.8 7 Under this model,
prices that are below the average variable cost (i.e., costs
that vary with the amount of output produced) of the
product in question are presumed to be predatory. The
idea is that a rational, profit-maximizing firm would have
no interest other than predation in pricing at such a level.
Areeda & Turner's classic model has been commented on
and criticized in several other articles.88 It has, however,
gained reasonably widespread judicial endorsement, both
in the U.S. and the EU. This may partly be due to its rela-
tive simplicity, or at least the fact that it is more easily ap-
87. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1975) (later restated and modi-
fied in PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 148-93 (1978)).
88. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: a Comment, 89
HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pric-
ing: a Reply, 89 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1976); F.M. Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory
Pricing, 89 HARv. L. REV. 901 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic
Perspective (1976). For a detailed treatment of the link between the economic literature
and legal doctrine in the United States, seeJoseph F. Brodey & George A. Hay, Predatory
Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L.
REv. 738 (1981).
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plied and understood by lawyers than some of the sug-
gested alternatives.
NoN-cosT BASED RULES. Given the difficulties in identify-
ing and allocating costs, and in formulating legal rules
based on measures of cost, certain economists and lawyers
argue that cost-based rules are inappropriate.8" Several
alternative approaches have been suggested. One ap-
proach, advocated by Oliver Williamson, is to assess the
dominant firm's strategic positioning of output to effec-
tively deter new entry without pricing below cost."° Wil-
liamson argued that a dominant firm can choose a plant
size and capital structure in anticipation of new entry that
permits it to respond to entry in such a way as to ensure
that the entrant loses money. A more extreme approach,
advocated by William Baumol, is to require the dominant
firm to continue any price reduction for a fixed period if
the rival exits.9 '
B. Below-Cost Selling in Community Law
Article 82 does not expressly prohibit predatory pricing.
Predatory pricing may, however, involve elements of discrimina-
89. Clearly, cost-based rules may not be appropriate in all situations. There are
industries with very high fixed costs where the cost of serving an additional customer or
laying on an additional service may be minimal. In these cases, costs may be an unrelia-
ble guide to the lawfulness of a dominant firm's competitive strategy. The most obvious
cases arise in the maritime and air transport sectors. In the United States, a Depart-
ment of Transportation study has concluded that exclusionary practices have occurred
in the industry without below-cost selling, in particular where the incumbent targets a
new entrant on its hub with capacity expansion and selective pricing. See Enforcement
Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation Industry, De-
partment of Transport Act, Pub. L. No. 1998-3713, 1847 (2001). However, this study
has not led to any final guidelines for assessing exclusionary behavior and none are, we
understand, expected in the near future. In the EU, the Commission also seems sensi-
tive to specific concerns in the air transport sector. In clearing a recent partnership
between Austrian Airlines and Lufthansa, the Commission required, inter alia, that each
time the airlines reduce a published fare on a route where they face the presence of a
new entrant, they should apply the same fare reduction, in percentage terms, on three
other routes on which they do not face competition. See Commission announces intention
to clear partnership between Austrian Airlines and Lufthansa, Press Release IP/01/1832
(Dec. 14, 2001). It is not clear whether such a remedy could be imposed in a final
decision but it does have some pragmatic appeal.
90. See Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: a Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87
YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
91. See WilliamJ. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: a Policy for Preventing
Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979).
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tion (Article 82(c)) or attempts to limit competitors' output (Ar-
ticle 82(a)). Relying on a combination of these principles and
the fact that the list of abuses under Article 82 is not exhaustive,
the Commission and the Community Courts have treated preda-
tory pricing as unlawful. In terms of economic models, Commu-
nity competition law relies on a mixture of cost-based models
and evidence of a plan to eliminate a rival.
There are only three cases in which below-cost selling has
been successfully challenged under Community law. (Deutsche
Post, which involved predation through cross-subsidization, is dis-
cussed in Part V.) The first case is AKZO/ECS, where the Com-
mission adopted both an interim measures decision and a final
decision against AKZO for various pricing practices in the or-
ganic peroxides sector. 2 The Commission's final decision was
upheld by the Court of Justice. The relevant facts were as fol-
lows. AKZO was active in the production of a wide range of or-
ganic peroxides and had a stable market share of approximately
50-55%. A small segment of this overall market concerned the
use of organic peroxide as a flour additive to bleach flour. Flour
additives were only used at the relevant time in Ireland and the
United Kingdom. ECS was active in this sector, which accounted
for the majority of its turnover, and held a market share of ap-
proximately 35%. The Commission found that AKZO had made
threats to ECS in a meeting aimed at securing ECS's withdrawal
from another segment of the organic peroxides market in which
it was active. AKZO threatened that, unless ECS withdrew from
this segment, it would face retaliatory measures in the flour addi-
tives segment. The Commission also found that AKZO engaged
in a series of below-cost pricing practices in the flour additives
sector, including below-cost pricing for certain additives gener-
ally and selectively below-cost prices to ECS's customers only.
(AKZO's prices were certainly below average total cost and there
were suggestions that they were below average variable cost too.)
The Court of Justice agreed with the vast majority of these find-
ings.
The principal interest of the judgment lies in the Court's
findings on the appropriate test to be applied under Community
law for predatory pricing. The Court adopted a two-part test




based on costs and intent. The Court held that prices below av-
erage variable cost are presumed to be predatory, while prices
above average variable cost but below average total cost are pred-
atory where they are part of a plan by the dominant firm to elim-
inate a competitor. This test broadly endorses the approach ad-
vocated by Areeda & Turner. The Court's findings also partly
rejected the thesis put forward by the Commission. The Com-
mission argued that the decisive criterion under Article 82
should not be costs, but the strategic objective behind the price-
cutting. The Commission accepted, however, that costs might
be of considerable importance in establishing the reasonable-
ness of the dominant firm's conduct.
The second case was Tetra Pak IIY Tetra Pak was found to
have committed a range of abuses in the aseptic and non-aseptic
machinery and carton sectors. These included both abusive con-
tractual terms and conditions and unilateral pricing practices.
Tetra Pak's market share in the various aseptic machinery and
carton markets was approximately 90% and had remained stable
over time. Although Tetra Pak's share in the various non-aseptic
markets was lower (approximately 50%), the Court of Justice
found that there were important associative links between the
aseptic and non-aseptic markets. In regard to predatory pricing,
the Commission's case was that Tetra Pak had engaged in preda-
tory pricing in relation to its Tetra Rex non-aseptic carton by
pricing below average variable cost. Tetra Pak argued that its
prices were not intended to eliminate competitors because they
were in response to intense competition from a competing non-
aseptic product offered by Elopak. After analyzing Tetra Pak's
costs, the Court concluded that Tetra Pak's costs were not only
below average total cost but also below average variable cost.
Under the rules established earlier by the Court in AKZO, these
prices were presumptively predatory and unlawful.
From a legal perspective, the most interesting aspects of the
judgment concern the Court's statements on recoupment. Cer-
tain U.S. courts have held that recoupment is an element of the
test for predatory pricing.94 It concerns the need to demon-
93. See Tetra Pak II Decision, 0J. L 72/1 (1992), appeal filed, Tetra Pak Interna-
tional SA v. Comm'n, Case T-83/91, [1994] E.C.R. 11-755.
94. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993). The other element of the test for predatory pricing under U.S. law is to show
[Vol. 26:83
DEFINING LEGITIMATE COMPETITION
strate the likelihood that the dominant firm would recoup the
losses sustained through the price cuts by being able to profita-
bly raise prices after having successfully caused rivals' market
exit. The Court of Justice held that, on the facts of the case, "it
[was] not necessary to demonstrate that the undertaking in ques-
tion had a reasonable prospect of recouping losses so in-
curred."9 5
C. Above-Cost Exclusionary Pricing in Community Law
A number of cases under Community competition law have
treated pricing above average variable cost (and even average to-
tal cost) as exclusionary. Many of these cases rely on circumstan-
tial evidence of intent to eliminate a rival by the dominant firm.
They are, however, unsatisfactory from an analytical point of
view in several respects. First, the Community Courts and the
Commission have not always clearly articulated the antitrust ob-
jection: in some cases, the objection seemed to be based on dis-
crimination between end-users; in others it has been assumed,
but not satisfactorily explained, that competitors would be ex-
cluded by a low (but above-cost) price. Second, many of the
cases involved evidence of other exclusionary behavior. As ex-
plained below, we distinguish these cases analytically from in-
stances of a single abuse. Finally, and perhaps most fundamen-
tally, neither the Commission nor the Community Courts have
explained in any satisfactory way how the rules for these cases
differ from the rules concerning predatory pricing. As ex-
plained above, the second AKZO rule provides that pricing
above average variable cost but below average total cost is unlaw-
ful if there is proof of a plan to eliminate a competitor. This
means that there must be some additional element for above-
cost pricing to be treated as illegal under Community competi-
tion law. We argue below that pricing above average variable
cost can only be unlawful if that pricing is coupled with other
clearly exclusionary conduct.
Hilti concerned a series of cumulative measures by a manu-
facturer of nail guns designed to deter customers who purchased
its nail guns from purchasing nails from competing nail manu-
that the prices complained of are below "an appropriate measure of its rival's cost." Id.
at 210.
95. Tetra Pak, [1994] E.C.R. 11-827, para. 150.
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facturers. 96 These measures included tied sales, inducing inde-
pendent distributors not to fulfill export orders, refusing to
honor guarantees for customers who purchased competing nails,
and various selective and discriminatory pricing policies. On the
pricing issues, Hilti was found to have offered customers who
purchased both its nails and guns more favorable discounts than
those that only purchased Hilti's guns and a competitor's nails.
This discount was not based on any efficiencies but the fact that
the customer would be dissuaded from purchasing competing
nails. The Commission concluded that the pricing practices
were illegal because they were "designed purely to damage the
business of, or deter market entry by, its competitors, whilst
maintaining higher prices for the bulk of its other customers, is
both exploitative of these customers and destructive of competi-
tion".97 The Community Courts were not clear on the antitrust
objection to these pricing practices. They held that the strategy
employed by Hilti was not a legitimate mode of competition,
since it was liable to deter other undertakings from establishing
themselves in the market and that the Commission "had good
reason to hold that such behavior on Hilti's part was im-
proper."98 The Community Courts did not explain how Hilti's
prices - which were not found to be below cost - would exclude
rivals or deter their entry.
In BPB Industries, the Commission condemned discounts of-
fered by BPB to plasterboard retailers that stocked only its plas-
terboard product.99 However, the Commission allowed BPB to
maintain discounts for retailers in certain areas of England that
were exposed to foreign competition, since there was no sugges-
tion that these discounts "were in themselves predatory, nor part
of any systematic alignment."l'
Irish Sugar also concerned a series of cumulative measures
by the dominant sugar producer in Ireland designed to keep out
competitive imports of sugar produced in other Member
States. 1' Among the measures employed by Irish Sugar were se-
lective pricing, export rebates, price discrimination, granting re-
96. See Hilti AG v. Comm'n, Case T-30/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1439.
97. Hili Decision, O.J. L 65/19, at 35, para. 81 (1988) (emphasis added).
98. Hilti, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1483, para. 100.
99. See BPB Industries Decision, O.J. L 10/50, para. 129 (1989).
100. Id. para. 133.
101. See Irish Sugar Decision, 0.J. L 258/1 (1997); affirmed in Case T-228/97,
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bates to customers located in border areas, product swaps and
fidelity rebates, and target rebates. The border rebates in ques-
tion were a scheme entered into by Irish Sugar and its distribu-
tion arm, SDL, under which rebates were offered only to retail
customers located close to the border of Northern Ireland,
where Irish Sugar had lost sales to competing sugar imports
from the United Kingdom. Irish Sugar claimed that those re-
bates were a legitimate response to meeting competition, and
could not be offered to all customers because of Irish Sugar's
loss-making position. In finding the border rebates abusive, the
Court of First Instance did not focus on whether the prices of-
fered were exclusionary of competitors but instead seemed to
focus on their market-partitioning effect and possible discrimi-
nation between customers:
In this case, the applicant has been unable to establish an
objective economic justification for the rebates. They were
given to certain customers in the retail sugar market by refer-
ence solely to their exposure to competition resulting from
cheap imports from another Member State and, in this case,
by reference to their being established along the border with
Northern Ireland. It also appears, according to the appli-
cant's own statements, that it was able to practise such price
rebates owing to the particular position it held on the Irish
market. Thus it states that it was unable to practice such re-
bates over the whole of Irish territory owing to the financial
losses it was making at the time. It follows that, by the appli-
cant's own admission, its economic capacity to offer rebates
in the region along the border with Northern Ireland de-
pended on the stability of its prices in other regions, which
amounts to recognition that it financed those rebates by
means of its sales in the rest of Irish territory. By conducting
itself in that way, the applicant abused its dominant position
in the retail sugar market in Ireland, by preventing the devel-
opment of free competition on that market and distorting its
structures, in relation to both purchasers and consumers.
The latter were not able to benefit, outside the region along
the border with Northern Ireland, from the price reductions
caused by the imports of sugar from Northern Ireland.1 °2
Compagnie Maritime Belge concerned various practices car-
[1999] E.C.R. 11-2969; and Irish Sugar v. Comm'n Case C-497/99 P, [2001] E.C.R. I-
5333.
102. Irish Sugar, [1999] E.C.R. II-3047-48, para. 188.
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ried out by the CEWAL liner shipping conference operating be-
tween Zaire and certain European ports, including adherence to
an agreement with the government of Zaire that led to de facto
exclusivity on certain routes for CEWAL, the imposition of 100%
loyalty contracts, and the practice of "fighting ships."'10 3 "Fight-
ing ships" is an established (but frowned upon) practice in mari-
time transport whereby sailing times are fixed as closely as possi-
ble to those of a competing liner and special discounted freight
rates applied for those sailings only. CEWAL, which enjoyed a
de facto monopoly on the relevant routes,, carried out certain
"fighting ship" practices for the avowed purpose of "getting rid"
of its competitor G&C.
Both Community Courts held that this practice was abusive.
In reaching this finding, they expressly rejected the appellants'
argument that selectively low prices could not be abusive unless
they were below cost within the meaning of AKZO. The Courts
held that there were features of CEWAL's conduct that rendered
the selectively low prices abusive: (1) the practice was carried
out for the express purpose of eliminating G&C, CEWAL's only
competitor; (2) CEWAL apportioned the losses incurred by the
price-cutting among them; and (3) price competition was al-
ready weakened in the maritime transport sector because the ap-
plicable legislation allowed collective tariff setting. However, the
Community Courts were very careful to limit their findings to
the unusual circumstances of the case. The judgment did not
address in what circumstances a dominant company may be al-
lowed to respond to competitive offers with selectively low prices:
It is not necessary, in the present case, to rule generally on
the circumstances in which a liner conference may legiti-
mately, on a case by case basis, adopt lower prices than those
of its advertised tariff in order to compete with a competitor
who quotes lower prices ... It is sufficient to recall that the
conduct at issue here is that of a conference having a share of
over 90% of the market in question and only one competitor.
The appellants have, moreover ... admitted at the hearing,
that the purpose of the conduct complained of was to elimi-
nate G&C from the market.1 0 4
103. Commission Decision No. 93/82/EEC, O.J. L 034/20 (1993), upheld on appeal
in Compagnie Maritime Beige.
104. Court of Justice of the European Communities (Fifth Chamber), Compagnie




1. Can Above-Cost Pricing Lead To Unlawful Exclusion?
As indicated above, Community competition law envisages
situations in which prices above average variable cost (and even
prices above average total cost) may be abusive. The result of
these cases appears to be that it is abusive for a dominant com-
pany to set out to eliminate a competitor entirely from the mar-
ket, whether by forcing it out or by preventing it from getting a
foothold. This may be legitimate if it is done by generalized low
prices. However, if the action is selective and goes further, by
significant undercutting or otherwise, than is necessary merely
to respond to competitive prices, and if selective price cuts are
combined with other exclusionary and not merely a response to
competition, then it seems that the price cuts as well as the other
conduct are unlawful. Community competition law suggests that
a dominant company may react to competition, but must not
overreact. Intent to eliminate a specific rival will also be consid-
ered an aggravating factor in this connection.
There are significant problems with this interpretation were
it to come to represent the general state of the law on above-cost
price-cutting without further qualification. In particular, al-
though the Commission and the Community Courts have made
it clear that, in principle, selectively low prices designed to re-
spond to competitive offers are legal, they have in practice pro-
ceeded to condemn nearly every instance where it has been
raised as a defense. Some of these cases concerned particularly
egregious conduct, but it is important that prices above average
variable cost should benefit from a very strong presumption of
legality. The situations in which a competitor can claim that a
price that remains average variable cost is anti-competitive
should be very narrowly circumscribed. Before attempting to ra-
tionalize these cases under Community competition law, it seems
useful to explore the principal economic and legal arguments
on whether pricing above average variable cost can be anticom-
petitive.
a. The Theoretical Underpinnings Of Above-Cost
Exclusionary Pricing
A number of leading antitrust scholars, including advocates
of the need for legal rules to prevent predatory pricing, argue
2002]
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that all pricing above average variable cost should be presumed
lawful. In essence, this conclusion assumes that firms that are
equally or more efficient than the dominant firm can compete
on the merits on the basis of pricing above average variable cost
and that there is no reason why antitrust law should offer them a
safe haven against price competition in that circumstance.
There is no net welfare loss if less efficient companies are elimi-
nated. As Richard Posner has noted: "[a] seller may want to
destroy a competitor, but if the only method used is underselling
him by virtue of having lower costs there is no rational antitrust
objection to the seller's conduct." 105 Areeda & Turner make a
similar point: "The low price at or above average cost is competi-
tion on the merits and excludes only less efficient rivals."'
'1 6
On the other hand, some economists argue that even prices
above average variable cost can be predatory and anticompeti-
tive. B.S. Yamey and Aaron Edlin have argued that there are a
number of instances in which predatory pricing can occur where
the dominant firm prices above its own costs but below those of
a rival. In such situations, they argue that the dominant firm can
eliminate a rival without incurring losses itself and will be free to
raise prices thereafter to above competitive levels. 107 Edlin
points to a number of situations in the U.S. air transport sector
where, in response to new entry, the incumbent monopolist ad-
ded capacity and reduced prices to levels that remained above-
cost only to increase prices back to pre-entry (monopoly) levels
when the entrant had been eliminated. He summarizes the
qualitative reasons why a dominant firm's costs may not be a reli-
able guide to the exclusionary nature of its pricing as follows:
[A] bove cost predatory pricing is possible if rivals have higher
costs than the incumbent monopoly (where predatory pricing
means low prices that hurt consumers by limiting competi-
tion). After all, a firm rarely achieves a monopoly without
one or more advantages. Any such firm probably has gone
down the cost learning curve and produces more efficiently
than a newcomer. The industry may enjoy increasing returns
to scale or scope. The firm may simply have a first-mover ad-
105. Posner, supra n.88, at 188.
106. Areeda & Turner, supra n.87, at 706.
107. See B.S. Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15J.L. & ECON. 129
(1972); see also Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941
(2002).
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vantage and be able to hide behind entry barriers from start-
up costs. It may have figured out how to make a superior
quality product, enjoy demand-side network externalities, or
simply have a familiar and trustworthy brand like Nutrasweet.
Some advantage or combination of advantages gives the firm
monopoly power in the first place. The very advantages that
give a firm monopoly power can allow it to drive out rivals
without pricing below cost.
10 8
In quantitative terms, it is also possible to explain how
above-cost pricing might lead to undesirable exclusion.
George Hay posits the following simple example.'0 9 A new
entrant has costs (MCe) that are below the price (Pm) charged
by the dominant company but greater than the dominant
firm's costs (MCm). Upon entry, the dominant firm lowers its
price to Pc, the entrant's break even point. Under the Areeda
& Turner model, the dominant company can still lower its
price further below P, as long as it does not go below its own
costs. The entrant is therefore making a loss and exits the









Source: Hay, A Confused Lawyers Guide To The Predatory Pricing Literature
Exit in these circumstances might seem undesirable but the key
question is whether there is a net deadweight loss. Conceivably,
yes. Assuming the new entrant captures a certain market share
108. Edlin, supra n.107, at 963.
109. See George A. Hay, A Confused Lawyer's Guide to the Predatory Pricing Literature in
JOURNAL OF REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 155-203
(1988).
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on the basis of price Pc, consumers will benefit from lower prices
than in the pre-entry situation where the price was Pro. This
should offset any deadweight loss caused by the lesser efficiency
achieved by the new entrant. It should also be remembered that
the new entrant should, over time, move down the learning
curve in the market and achieve greater efficiency.
b. How to Understand The Case Law Under
Community Competition Law
Economic literature to the effect that, exceptionally, prices
above the dominant firm's costs can be anticompetitive may help
explain why such pricing practices have been condemned in sev-
eral cases under Community competition law. However, this
literature does not address whether a legal rule to that effect is
necessary or identify the legal criteria for such a rule under
Community competition law. In our view, there are three possi-
ble interpretations of the case law, but only one - the first - is
correct.
i. Cumulative evidence of abusive behavior
The first explanation for the case law is that pricing above
average variable cost is only unlawful where it is coupled with a
range of other exclusionary measures, i.e., there is cumulative
evidence of abuse as part of a plan to eliminate a rival. The pric-
ing is not unlawful in itself but can be viewed as unlawful where
linked with other exclusionary practices. The pricing is a key
part of an overall exclusionary policy and there is no other ex-
planation for it. It could not be regarded as pro-competitive
conduct which happened to coincide in time with an exclusion-
ary policy: it made sense only as part of that policy and was
clearly linked to that policy. While imprecise, this interpretation
is one that the legal advisers of a dominant company can use.
Irish Sugar, Hilti, and Tetra Pak could all be explained on
that basis. In those cases there were not only selectively low
prices but also fidelity rebates, tying, exclusive contracts, and tar-
get rebates. The above approach was also effectively taken by
the Advocate General and the judgment of the Court of First
Instance in Compagnie Maritime Belge. The Advocate General said
that the various practices were designed to drive the competitor
from the market at minimal cost to the dominant companies, so
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as to restore their virtual monopoly and raise their prices there-
after. The assumption is that any set of practices which are de-
signed to exclude a competitor from the market and which are
likely to succeed in their aim are likely to constitute a barrier to
entry, and that they cannot be regarded merely as legitimate
price competition.110
In that regard, intent or selective price-cutting targeted only
at that rival may offer evidence of an exclusionary plan, pro-
vided, of course, there are exclusionary measures in addition to
the low prices. However, it must always be remembered that
dominant firms are entitled to compete and to match and beat
competitors' prices if they remain above average variable cost.
There are also different types of intent. Sales hyperbole is differ-
ent from an egregious plan with the avowed purpose of putting a
rival out of business by any means. Most fundamentally, how-
ever, while intent or selectivity may offer some indication of the
strategic objectives behind the price-cutting, they do not excuse
a plaintiff or regulator from demonstrating that the price-cutting
would in fact lead to unlawful exclusion.
ii. "Superdominance"
The second explanation - which we do not accept - con-
cerns situations where there are very high barriers to entry, or
"superdominance" as it has become fashionably known. In such
cases, it is argued that the effect of the dominant company's ex-
cluding a new entrant through strategic price-cutting may be a
quasi-permanent monopoly. There has been some recent dis-
cussion of this situation in the EU and cases such as Tetra Pak
and Irish Sugar could also be explained on the basis of such a
theory. In Compagnie Maritime Belge, it was suggested that the
scope of the duties of a company in a dominant position must be
considered in the light of the specific circumstances of each
110. A possible sub-set of the first category concerns pricing that is intended to
insulate Member States from products imported from other Member States. For exam-
ple, in Irish Sugar, considerable importance was attached to the fact that the sugar mar-
kets in Ireland were already insulated from competition through protectionist govern-
ment policies and that Irish Sugar used all available means to keep imports of foreign
sugar out of Ireland. The Court of First Instance clearly stated that this was inimical to
the purpose of the single market and the objectives of the EC Treaty. See Irish Sugar,
[1999] E.C.R. 11-3046, para. 185. However, it is submitted that this approach is of lim-
ited economic relevance: whether a price is exclusionary should not depend on the
location of the competing supplier.
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case, and that a company with a particularly high market share
may have stricter duties under Article 82 than those of a "nor-
mal" dominant enterprise."1 Advocate General Fennelly put
the matter as follows:
Community competition law should.., not offer less efficient
undertakings a safe haven against vigorous competition even
from dominant undertakings. Different considerations may,
however, apply where an undertaking which enjoys a position
of dominance approaching a monopoly, particularly on a
market on which price cuts can be implemented with relative
autonomy from costs, implements a policy of selective price
cutting with the demonstrable aim of eliminating all competi-
tion. In those circumstances, to accept that all selling above
cost was automatically acceptable could enable the undertak-
ing in question to eliminate all competition by pursuing a se-
lective pricing policy which in the long run would permit it to
increase prices and to deter potential future entrants for fear
of receiving the same targeted treatment.'12
The Advocate General continued:
To my mind, Article 86 [now Article 82] cannot be inter-
preted as permitting monopolists or quasi-monopolists to ex-
ploit the very significant market power which their super-
dominance confers so as to preclude the emergence either of
a new or additional competitor. Where an undertaking, or
group of undertakings whose conduct must be assessed col-
lectively, enjoys a position of such overwhelming dominance
verging on monopoly.., it would not be consonant with the
particularly onerous special obligation affecting such a domi-
nant undertaking not to impair further the structure of the
feeble existing competition for them to react, even to aggres-
sive price competition from a new entrant, with a policy of
targeted, selective, price cuts designed to eliminate that com-
petitor .... [T] he mere fact that such prices are not pitched
at a level that is actually (or can be shown to be) below total
average (or long-run marginal) costs does not, to my mind,
render legitimate the application of such a pricing policy.' 13
The recent judgment of the UK Competition Commission
Appeal Tribunal in the Napp Pharmaceutical case was more ex-
Ill. Compagnie Maritime Belge, [2000] E.C.R. 1-1410, para. 115.
112. Id. at 1-1418.
113. Id. at 1-1420-21.
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plicit on this point and even used the term "superdomi-
nance."" 4 The Tribunal said:
We for our part accept and follow the opinion of Advocate
General Fennelly in Compagnie Maritime Belge... that the spe-
cial responsibility of a dominant undertaking is particularly
onerous where it is a case of a quasi-monopolist enjoying
'dominance approaching monopoly', 'superdominance' or
'overwhelming dominance approaching monopoly'
Napp's high and persistent market shares put Napp into the
category of 'dominance approaching monopoly' - i.e.,
superdominance and the issue of abuse in this case has to be
addressed in that specific context.'
1 5
Napp had maintained a market share over 90% and it was
clear that it was selling at prices well below its costs. Therefore,
there was no need to use the concept of "superdominance": it
was clear that it was committing an abuse under the AKZO prin-
ciple. But the Tribunal went to some lengths to show that Napp
also came within a broader principle found in Irish Sugar and
Compagnie Maritime Belge. Napp had been selling its products be-
low cost to hospitals, and was able to keep its competitors out of
the much larger market segment for sales into the community
(i.e., patients at home) if it could prevent competitors from sell-
ing to hospitals. Napp had therefore succeeded in keeping its
competitors out of the gateway into the market, and therefore
out of the whole market. Napp was "a virtual monopolist that
has been selling at prices well below direct cost, and doing so
selectively on those tablet strengths where it has faced competi-
tion. '  The Tribunal said that Compagnie Maritime Belge and
Irish Sugar show that:
even if the prices of a dominant firm remain above costs, and
simply match the price of a competitor, there may still be an
abuse, at least where a superdominant firm is concerned, if
the reduced prices in question are made on a selective basis
and have no economic rationale other than the elimination
114. Napp Pharm. Holdings Ltd. and Subsidiaries v. Dir. Gen. of Fair Trading,
Case No. 1001/1/1/01,judgment ofJan. 15, 2002, available at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/appeals/current.htm. Although this judgment applied UK law, the
relevant section of the UK Competition Act is virtually identical to the wording of Arti-
cle 82, and the Act requires that it is to be interpreted and applied in a manner consis-
tent with Community competition law.
115. Id. at 55, para. 219.
116. Id. at 57, para. 225.
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of competition." 7
Later the Tribunal said:
Napp is a superdominant undertaking in both the hospital
and community segments with, in consequence, a particularly
onerous special responsibility 'not to impair further the struc-
ture of the feeble existing competition'. . . . Napp is a super-
dominant undertaking with well over 90% of the market.
During the period of the infringement it had only one signifi-
cant competitor .... Irish Sugar ... shows that selective dis-
counting by a dominant undertaking, without any economic
justification, which tends to eliminate competition, is . .. an
abuse. 11 8
It is not easy to see the justification for the suggestion that
companies with especially high market shares have additional
duties not applicable to other dominant companies: what could
they be? All dominant companies should be free to compete by
legitimate means, and none should be allowed to compete by
exclusionary means. The idea of superdominance does not help
to distinguish between them, and does not (and could not) val-
idly suggest that some pro-competitive practices become an-
ticompetitive if the company adopting them has a high enough
market share. Any concept of "superdominance" that is predi-
cated on high market shares (whatever they are) also misses the
point. High market shares are only meaningful if there are also
very high barriers to entry; if not the market should be contesta-
ble and the dominant firm's market share eroded by new entry.
The better way to understand these cases is that companies
which are in very strong market positions are better placed and
have greater incentives to eliminate new entrants entirely from
the market. Companies which are dominant, but have less mar-
ket power, are less likely to try or to be able to push their only
competitor out. Clearly, however, if they did do so by unlawful
means, that too would be an abuse. This means that "super-
dominance" is at best a concept that covers the probable effects
of exclusionary conduct carried out by near-monopoly firms
rather than a separate legal rule. The concept of "superdomi-
nance", if it was to be useful (which we doubt), would require
both a definition of when it exists and a description of the addi-
117. Id. at 58, para. 230.
118. Id. at 87-88, paras. 337-39.
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tional constraints which it would imply. There is no obvious ba-
sis, need or justification for either, and any attempt to invent
them would complicate the law still further. In particular, it
would be unfortunate if the idea of superdominance became ac-
cepted without clarification of the distinction between legitimate
price competition and exclusionary practices. Legitimate price
competition, which competition law exists to promote, can also
eliminate competitors.
iii. Selectivity and intent
The final explanation - which we also reject - is that se-
lectively low pricing and intent to eliminate a competitor render
unlawful pricing that would otherwise be legal. Clearly, Commu-
nity competition law attaches a great deal of importance to in-
tent and the selective nature of the price-cutting in determining
whether prices are predatory. The second AKZO rule states that
prices above average variable cost but below average total cost
may be considered predatory if they are "part of a plan to elimi-
nate a competitor." Similar presumptions are applied in the
case of above-cost pricing that has been treated as exclusionary.
In Hilti, the Commission found that above-cost selective price
cuts were illegal because they were "designed purely to damage
the business of, or deter market entry by, competitors, while
maintaining higher prices for the bulk of its other customers, is
both exploitative of these customers and destructive of competi-
tion." '119 Both Community Courts in Compagnie Maritime Belge at-
tached importance to the fact that CEWAL had agreed a plan to
"get rid of' its only competitor. The BPB Industries, Napier Brown,
and Irish Sugar cases also noted that the selective (above-cost)
prices were directed at competitors' customers. This has led
some commentators to conclude that the unlawful element is se-
lectivity or the intent to injure a rival and that dominant firms'
pricing must be non-discriminatory to be lawful. 2 °
This cannot be right. First, there cannot be a per se non-
discrimination rule for price-cutting above average variable cost.
The second AKZO rule states that a plan to eliminate a competi-
tor may be relevant to establish predation if prices are above av-
erage variable cost but below average total cost. But if prices are
119. Hilti Decision, O.J. L 65/19, para. 81 (1988).
120. See Andrews, supra n.59, at 53.
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above average total cost, it cannot be the case that the same cir-
cumstance also means that those prices are abusive. If that were
the case, the second AKZO rule would not be a rule relating to
predatory pricing at all but a strict non-discrimination principle
for all pricing carried out by dominant firms. For the reasons
outlined above, there is not, nor should there be, any such rule.
Second, the "selectivity" of a price cut is not relevant in any
economic sense if prices remain above cost. A selectively low
price targeted at a competitor's customers is the same thing as a
generally low price offered by the dominant company. In either
case, the effective price that the competitor has to face is the
same. A dominant company may be able to sustain a price-cut-
ting campaign longer if it only offers selectively low prices, but
this can only be relevant, if at all, to below-cost prices, since
above-cost prices are still incrementally profitable and do not
need a subsidy from non-discounted sales. Unless the selectively
low price is below cost, it is still a profitable price for the domi-
nant company and will in nearly all cases be a price at which a
competitor should be able to survive.
Third, all profit-maximizing companies "intend" to elimi-
nate their rivals and the most obvious way of doing this is
through price competition. It is almost impossible to distinguish
between the "intent" that the antitrust laws should prohibit and
the "intent" that they encourage. One U.S. Circuit Court vividly
described the problems with penalizing intent as follows:
[F]irms "intend" to do all the business they can, to crush their
rivals if they can ... Rivalry is harsh, and consumers gain the
most when firms slash costs to the bone and pare price down
to cost, all in pursuit of more business. Few firms cut price
unaware of what they are doing; price reductions are carried
out in pursuit of sales, at others' expense. Entrepreneurs
who work hardest to cut their prices will do the most damage
to their rivals, and they will see good in it. You cannot be a
sensible business executive without understanding the link
among prices, your firm's success, and other firms' distress. If
courts use the vigorous, nasty pursuit of sales as evidence of a
forbidden "intent," they run the risk of penalizing the motive
forces of competition."'




The Commission also seems to recognize these dangers, even if
in practice they do not seem to have deterred it from treating
prices above average variable cost as unlawful on the basis of cir-
cumstantial evidence of intent:
The Commission emphasizes that it does not consider an in-
tention even by a dominant firm to prevail over its rivals as
unlawful. A dominant firm is entitled to compete on the mer-
its. Nor does the Commission suggest that larger producers
should be under an obligation to refrain from competing vig-
orously with smaller competitors or new entrants.
122
Finally, antitrust enforcement that depends on circumstan-
tial evidence of intent as a necessary legal condition is haphazard
and risks using hyperbole as a basis for intervention. Inflam-
matory documents are easily concealed and more easily taken
out of context.
c. Our Suggested Approach
Although there appears to be some view that prices above
average variable cost exceptionally may be anticompetitive, it is
hard to see how a clear legal rule could capture the relatively
small number of situations in which that occurs. Condemning
above-cost pricing should be approached with considerable re-
serve, since price competition is almost always desirable and it is
very difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a legal rule to distin-
guish between an above--cost low price that will eliminate a com-
petitor and one which will not. It is notable that the proponents
of the theory that above-cost pricing can be exclusionary have
not been able to formulate a satisfactory legal rule to that effect.
Baumol's idea that the dominant firm should be required to
maintain the low price for a period of eighteen months or so
seems unworkable and an overreaction to the actual scope of the
underlying problem. Edlin's idea that the dominant firm should
be prevented from responding with substantial price cuts or sig-
nificant product enhancements until the entrant becomes "via-
ble" suffers from a similar problem and from definitional issues.
Neither thesis could form the basis of any sensible legal rule. In
our view, the only exception to the rule that pricing above aver-
age variable cost is always legal concerns situations where there is
clear evidence of a cumulative pattern of other exclusionary
122. ECS/AKZO Decision, O.J. L 374/1, at 21, para. 81 (1985).
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abuses in addition to low pricing. This exception would provide
legal advisers with a workable framework. It is also consistent
with the AKZO case, which states that prices above average varia-
ble cost but below average total cost may only be unlawful if they
form "part of a plan to eliminate a competitor."
2. The Legal Rules: The Need For Recoupment
Under EU Law
One difference between EU and U.S. law on predatory pric-
ing is that recoupment is not an element of the test in EU law.
Some U.S. courts have held that, in addition to proving that the
pricing complained of is below an appreciable measure of cost,
there must be a reasonable prospect of recovering the losses in-
curred by the below-cost price through the dominant firm's sub-
sequently raising prices. In Brooke Group, the Supreme Court
laid out a two-prong test for recoupment. First, "below-cost pric-
ing must be capable.., of producing the intended effects on the
firm's rivals, whether driving them from the market, or ... caus-
ing them to raise their prices to supra-competitive levels."123
Such a determination is to be based on factors such as "the ex-
tent and duration of the alleged predations, the relative finan-
cial strength of the predator and its intended victim, and their
respective incentives and will. The inquiry is whether, given the
aggregate losses caused by the below-cost pricing, the intended
target would likely succumb."' 2 4 Second, it must be shown that
"the predatory scheme alleged would cause a rise in prices above
a competitive level that would be sufficient to compensate for
the amounts expended on the predations, including the time
value of the money invested in it.' 25 This determination will
depend on "an estimate of the cost of the alleged predation and
the close analysis of both the scheme alleged by the plaintiff and
the structure and conditions of the relevant market."126 If either
element of recoupment is not possible, the claim fails. Factors
such as new entry, the ability to expand capacity, and whether
the market is diffuse will influence to what extent recoupment is
possible.' 2
7
123. Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 225.
124. Id.
125. Id.




Although not universally applied by the U.S. courts, the the-
oretical underpinnings of the recoupment test have much to
commend them, even if, in practice, they constitute a considera-
ble barrier to plaintiffs trying to establish a predatory pricing
claim. The basic objection to predatory pricing implicitly as-
sumes that the ability to recover losses will make short-term pric-
ing cutting both anti-competitive and profitable because higher
prices can be charged once market exit has been caused and
rivals are deterred from entering again. If the price-cutting does
not lead to some recovery by the dominant firm, this will in
nearly all cases mean that rivals have been able to offset the ef-
fects of those price cuts or re-enter at a later stage, or that new
entry is possible and will keep prices at competitive levels.
Reaction in the EU to the need to have recoupment as a
legal condition has been mixed, but generally hostile. As ex-
plained above, in Tetra Pak II, the Court of Justice rejected the
notion of recoupment as necessary, at least in so far as the egre-
gious circumstances of that case were concerned. Likewise, the
UK Competition Authority, the OFT, takes the position that re-
coupment is relevant only if a dominant firm uses revenues from
a dominated market in order to engage in predatory conduct in
a non-dominated market, i.e., in cases of cross-subsidization.' 28
According to the OFT, if pricing below cost occurs in a domi-
nated market, it can be assumed that the dominant firm can
recoup losses afterwards.
More recent judicial statements have been supportive of the
need for recoupment as a necessary legal condition for preda-
tory pricing. In CEWAL, Advocate General Fennelly stated that
recoupment was implicit in the Court of Justice's statements in
AKZO and Hoffman-La Roche and that some form of recoupment
"should be part of the test for abusively low pricing by dominant
undertakings.1 29 Indeed, in that case, the Advocate General
stated that the sharing of losses resulting from the price-cutting
among the CEWAL members was in essence a form of recoup-
ment. This seems only partly correct. While loss-sharing may
make it easier to share the cost of eliminating a competitor (the
first limb of the recoupment test under U.S. law), it does not
directly affect the possibility for supra-competitive prices to be
128. See OFT 414, supra n.47, at 16.
129. Compagnie Maritime Beige, E.C.R. 1-1419, para. 136.
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maintained thereafter (the second limb under U.S. law). That
said, it seems reasonably clear from the CEWAL case that
CEWAL's insistence on exclusive contracts, its 100% loyalty re-
bates, its reputation for taking significant retaliatory measures
against its only competitor, and the high fixed costs that would
have be incurred by a new entrant would have been sufficient to
ensure that recoupment was feasible.
Likewise, in AKZO and Tetra Pak II, the companies con-
cerned were dominant in a wide range of products but only en-
gaged in selective price-cutting for one product that a competi-
tor offered. Given their dominance in a wide portfolio of prod-
ucts, it was probable that the threat of retaliation against a rival
supplying only one of those products was a credible deterrent
that would have allowed recoupment because other rivals would
have been dissuaded from entering. In other words, all cases in
which predatory pricing was found under Community competi-
tion law seemed prima facie capable of supporting probable re-
coupment.
There are, however, reasons to treat a strict recoupment re-
quirement with caution. First, it is often difficult to prove what
the dominant company could do successfully at an unspecified
time in the future. It would be necessary to show that there
would be no entry by more competitive or more determined ri-
vals, and that when the dominant company increased its price, it
would not attract new entry. It would also be necessary to show
that the price elasticity of the product was such that, although
buyers were accustomed to low prices, they would be willing to
pay significantly higher ones in the future. All of this suggests
that the burden of proof is crucial. If the burden of proof was
on the party alleging illegal low prices, it would make it difficult
to bring a successful case. If the burden of proof was on the
dominant company, it would be obliged to prove a negative, that
is, to prove that it would be unable to recoup its losses if it tried
to do so.
Second, predatory pricing by a dominant company may
have anticompetitive effects even if the dominant company does
not or could not recoup its losses. The most effective form of
predatory pricing is one where a company discourages market
entry, or causes exit, by signaling to actual or potential competi-
tors that their profitability in the market in question will be low
as long as the dominant company is price leader in that market.
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This signaling would be more effective, and the effects of it
would last longer, if the dominant company did not have to re-
cover its losses, but held its prices only a little above competitive
levels. This discouraging or signaling effect is particularly likely
to be important if the dominant company is active on several
markets, because predatory pricing on one market may discour-
age market entry on the others. This is particularly important in
air transport, where predatory pricing, if it occurred on one
route, would discourage entry on the other routes on which the
dominant airline was operating.
Finally, predatory pricing may have anticompetitive effects
even if the rival is not forced out of the market, but instead de-
cides to raise its prices to approximately the prices of the domi-
nant company. In particular, in a concentrated market preda-
tory pricing may demonstrate the dominant company's ability
and willingness to retaliate against aggressive pricing by a com-
petitor, and so may give rise to oligopolistic pricing. In such cir-
cumstances it would be extremely difficult to prove that recoup-
ment had occurred, even if it had.
In the circumstances, an express recoupment requirement
might complicate the law further and impose an unfair burden
on the party that bore that burden. Further, the absence of an
express recoupment requirement does not, in our view, risk seri-
ous divergence between EU and U.S. law. In EU law, the prohi-
bition on predatory pricing only applies to companies that are
dominant. If a company is found dominant, that already sug-
gests a high market share, a certain degree of immunity from
normal competitive forces, and high barriers to entry in the rele-
vant market concerned. An incumbent with a large share in
such a market may be able to exclude new entrants effectively
through below-cost price-cutting, particularly where there are
large sunk costs or structural features of the market that require
a minimum efficient entry or network effects. Thus, in many
cases, the prevailing market conditions that contribute to domi-
nance may also offer a good indication that rivals' exclusion will
lead to anticompetitively high prices in the future, and that re-
coupment is therefore probable.
3. Defenses For Below-Cost Pricing
The Commission's decisional practice and the Community
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Courts' case law have often assumed that the only explanation
for below-cost pricing is predation. This seems overly restrictive,
since there are a number of legitimate pro-competitive reasons
for short-term below-cost selling. Different defenses apply de-
pending on whether the price charged is above or below average
variable cost.
a. Prices Below Average Variable Cost
Where the price charged is below average variable cost, it
usually will be safe to assume that it is predatory, since a domi-
nant firm will normally have no interest in charging such a price
in the medium to long-term. However, a few defenses might still
be applicable. The first is the principle established in the General
Motors judgment, which suggests that it may be a defense if the
company genuinely did not know the facts that showed that its
price was unlawful and corrected the price as soon as it found
out °30 The second possible defense is that the dominant com-
pany is launching a product or service in a new market, and so
inevitably the first sales, whatever the price charged, will not
cover the average variable costs that are being incurred or have
already been incurred. A defense on these lines must be permis-
sible; otherwise dominant companies would be unable to enter
new markets. The third possible defense is that the low price or
free gift is a short-term promotion or trial offer made as a means
of getting attention for the product or service in question.
There is nevertheless an element of reasonableness for below-
cost selling in the case of new markets or promotional offers:
long-term or repeat promotional offers may be tantamount to
predatory price-cutting. As the OFT states:
A dominant undertaking which adopts a one-off short-term
promotion [below average variable costs for a limited period]
is unlikely to be found in contravention of the Chapter II pro-
hibition [abuse of a dominant position]. However, a series of
short term promotions could, taken together, amount to a
predatory strategy. 131
In addition, the strategic objectives behind loss-leading are also
important: price-cutting designed to exclude rivals' access to
130. See General Motors Continental NV v Conm'n, Case 26/75, [1975] E.C.R.
1367, 1380, paras. 20-21.
131. See OFT 414, supra n.47, at 12.
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market "gateways" should be treated more harshly than loss-lead-
ing that is genuinely intended to allow consumers to test new
products. A final defense might be that the product is being
phased out. Some revenues are better than no revenues where
fixed-cost recovery is concerned and the scope for exclusion in
such circumstance is limited.
Loss-leading raises more difficult issues. Loss-leading is
practiced by companies selling a number of products, and is de-
signed to attract buyers to the seller in the expectation that,
once the buyer is on the seller's premises or committed to cer-
tain purchases anyway, the buyer will buy enough of other prod-
ucts to provide a profit greater than the loss on the product used
as the loss leader. The most common example is probably food
sold in a supermarket. Loss-leaders in these circumstances tend
to involve different products on each occasion. But the same
kind of issues are raised by a company which consistently sells
capital equipment at a loss with a view to recovering the loss on
subsequent sales of spare parts, consumables, or maintenance or
repair services. In all these situations it seems that there is a
valid defense if it is reasonable for the dominant company to
expect that, as a result of the sale below cost, revenue will be
obtained from other sales, which would not otherwise have been
made, and that the expected or average additional revenue will
exceed the amount of the loss. In other words, it is lawful to sell
a system or combination of products in this way even if the initial
sale is made at a loss (except, perhaps, where the same products
are always sold at a loss and there is a rival which only produces
that product). It would be useful to be able to show that com-
petitors were able to use the same strategy if they wished, even if
the competitors were clearly not subject to the obligations of
dominant companies. However, if the competitors were not in a
position to use the same strategy successfully, selling below cost
in a market "gateway" might have serious exclusionary effects.
This was the situation in the Napp Pharmaceuticals judgment of
the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal discussed. above.
Finally, the defense of meeting competition explained in
detail in Part III above will also be applicable. Even dominant
firms should be allowed to compete where there is a genuine
price war with rivals. However, in the case of pricing below aver-
age variable cost, the dominant firm should be allowed to meet,
but not undercut, the rival's price. Otherwise, the dominant
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firm could always put rivals out of business through predatory
pricing by arguing that it was responding to a competitive offer.
Moreover, unlike in the case of pricing above average variable
cost, such a rule should not lead to price collusion between the
dominant firm and its rivals: the dominant firm will not have
any interest in agreeing on prices below average variable cost.
b. Price Above Average Variable Cost But
Below Average Total Cost
If the price in question is above average variable costs but
below average total costs, different questions arise and a wider
range of defenses will be available. Under the second AKZO
rule, selling at such a price is lawful unless there is evidence of
exclusionary intent. There may be several explanations other
than predation for pricing above variable costs but below aver-
age total cost:
* As in the case of pricing below average variable cost, the
dominant firm should be allowed to respond to competi-
tive offers. However, unlike in the case of pricing below
average variable cost, the dominant firm should be al-
lowed not only to meet the rival's price but also to under-
cut it. Otherwise, there is a risk, for the reasons explained
in Part III above, that the rival would benefit from a price
floor and that the firms would be tempted to collude on
pricing.
" The sale is being made during a period of reduced de-
mand in which no supplier of the product or service is
able to sell at a price sufficient to cover its average total
costs. A dominant company in such circumstances must
be free to sell what it can at whatever prices it can obtain,
for cash-flow reasons. Loss-minimizing is also the basis for
the defense that goods are being sold below average total
costs because they are obsolete, deteriorating, or would
cost so much to store until they could be sold at a higher
price that the loss would be minimized by immediate sale.
The principle of loss-minimizing or profit-maximizing is
probably the principle applicable in one difficult and con-
troversial type of situation, in which the marginal or aver-
age variable cost of each additional sale is near to zero,
but the effect is that competitors can sell their products
only with difficulty or not at all. If, however, this is the
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effect of legitimate economies of scale or scope, a price at
the average variable cost is not predatory, once the capital
costs have been covered. Before they have been covered,
the start-up defense may be applicable. Below cost pric-
ing in these circumstances should not be regarded as
predatory in the absence of some exclusionary intent.
Even where there is exclusionary intent, it will be neces-
sary to evaluate whether loss-minimizing or predation is
the real reason for the low price.
* It should be a defense to show that the price in question,
although below average total costs, was a loss-minimizing
price at the time it was charged. A dominant company
with high capital costs may be obliged to sell at prices well
below its total costs for a substantial initial period until it
reaches a certain scale of operations, or a minimum num-
ber of customers in a network industry.
• If product storage costs over the long-term would result in
some selling below average total cost, it may be more ra-
tional to sell below average total cost immediately to make
some saving.
All these defenses have to be assessed in light of the facts as
they were known to the dominant company at the time it made
the below-cost sale. If the price chosen was a reasonable and
rational price to minimize losses at that time, the defense is valid
even if, with hindsight, it appears that another strategy would
have been more profitable or would have had less exclusionary
effect. Similarly, a loss-leader sale is lawful if the information
available to the company showed that on average it was probable
that the loss incurred would be recovered from sales of other
products or services, which would not have been made without
the below-cost sale. The same principle applies to yield manage-
ment by airlines, which leads them to sell the last seat on a plane
just before it takes off for a minimal price because if they did not
sell it at that price, the seat would be empty. In the case of yield
management, as in the case of other sales of systems or loss-lead-
ers leading to sales of other products, the price is not predatory
unless the company is likely to make a loss overall.
Whether the above defenses should be available where the
pricing is accompanied by other exclusionary practices will de-
pend on the nature of those exclusionary practices and the de-
fense claimed. If the other exclusionary practice is an exclusive
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purchasing commitment, it will not be relevant to say that the
dominant firm was responding to a competitive offer. Similarly,
if there is evidence of tying practices in addition to price-cutting,
it will not usually be a justification to argue that the dominant
firm was responding to competitive threats in the market for the
tied product. In contrast, where goods are obsolete, deteriorat-
ing, or would incur substantial storage costs if unsold, the fact
that the discounted price is coupled with an exclusive purchas-
ing commitment for the quantities in question should not invali-
date the defense of loss-minimizing.
V. CROSS-SUBSIDIES - A SPECIFIC CASE
OF PREDATORY PRICING
A. Introductory Remarks
Cross-subsidies are not mentioned in Article 82, and brief
references in the case law of the Community Courts do not make
clear when a cross-subsidy might be an abuse. 32 In general
terms, cross-subsidization occurs where a company uses funds
generated from one area of activity to fund activities in another
area of its activity. A cross-subsidy may give rise to an antitrust
problem if the dominant company has a monopoly or near-mo-
nopoly position in one market, and also has activities in another
related market where it is in competition with competitors who
sell only in the second market. Competitors in the second mar-
ket have to meet all the costs necessary for their production for
that market ("stand-alone costs"). The horizontally integrated
dominant company however has several kinds of costs. It has
"incremental costs" which arise only because of its operations in
the competitive market, and which would cease if its operations
in that market ceased. It also has or is likely to have costs which
are common to its operations in both markets, but which would
be unaffected by cessation of its activities in the competitive mar-
ket. It also has costs which arise only because of its operations in
the market in which it has a monopoly. The problem for the
competitor is that the dominant company is able to spread its
common costs over two sets of operations instead of only one -
in other words, it has economies of scale or scope.
132. See e.g. Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova SpA v. Siderugica Gabrielli SpA,
Case C-179/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5889, para. 19.
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Various approaches have been used to detect cross-subsi-
dies, but there are essentially two approaches that should be
mentioned. First, if the monopolist's prices in the second mar-
ket cover the incremental cost of producing products in that
market, there is no cross-subsidy. A second approach is to calcu-
late the stand-alone cost of producing each output separately
from other outputs: if the price for each output covers those
costs, there is no cross-subsidy.
A number of regulatory issues are raised by cross-subsidies,
particularly in the context of utilities and regulated markets, in-
cluding the need for structural and accounting separation be-
tween reserved monopoly and competitive businesses. In the
context of Article 82, it is assumed that cross-subsidy cases are in
essence cases in which the abuse, if there is one, is predatory
pricing.' Multi-product companies cross-subsidize all the time,
whether or not they realize that they are doing so. There is no
abuse of cross-subsidizing in the absence of predatory prices,
since an above-cost price does not by definition need any sub-
sidy. The important issue therefore under Article 82 is which
costs must be taken into account in determining whether the
lower price in the competitive market is predatory.
Two different approaches are possible. The approach
which has always been understood to be the correct one is to
require the dominant enterprise to allocate its common costs,
on some appropriate basis, between the monopoly market and
the competitive market. This would not deprive it of the benefit
of economies of scope or scale, but would ensure that in other
respects it would be competing on an equal footing in the com-
petitive market. Its economies of scope would give it a legitimate
133. In UPS Europe SA v. Comm'n (Deutsche Post AG, intervening), Case T-175/
99, [2002] 5 C.M.L.R. 2, the Court of First Instance said that "the mere fact that an
exclusive right is granted to an undertaking in order to guarantee that it provides a
service of general economic interest does not preclude that undertaking from earning
profits from the activities reserved to it or from extending its activities into non-reserved
areas." Id. at para. 51. The Court went on (para. 55) to say that the use of profits from
reserved activities to buy another company could raise problems where the funds used
derived from excessive or discriminatory prices or from other unfair practices (that is,
presumably, practices contrary to Article 82). In such a situation, it is necessary to look
at the source of the funds to see if the purchase of the other company resulted from
abuse of a dominant position. Cfi Criminal proceedings against Paul Corbeau, Case C-
320/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-2533.
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competitive advantage, but it could not use its internal cost allo-
cation to create a barrier to entry into the competitive market.
The second approach is to essentially apply the AKZO rules
to the competitive market only. If there is no evidence of a plan
to eliminate a competitor, only average variable costs would be
relevant; average total costs need not be calculated (and so there
is little or no need to allocate common costs, because most com-
mon costs are fixed). In fact, if there are no incremental fixed
costs, the AKZO average variable costs test and the pure incre-
mental-costs-only test come to the same thing. However, the
AKZO case was treated as involving only one product market,
and the "cross-subsidy" which predatory prices always imply was
within a single product market for a relatively short period. The
AKZO case, in other words, is analogous to the case of the last
seat on the airplane on a given flight, not to a situation in which
a dominant company is operating in separate markets with some
common costs. It would not therefore seem right to apply the
AKZO test to a two-market situation and to apply it over a period
of several years in circumstances where: (i) a large proportion of
the dominant company's costs in the competitive market were
common costs; and (ii) the dominant company's revenues in the
competitive market were above its costs there only if that propor-
tion was allocated exclusively to the uncompetitive market. It is
obviously a weakness of the first AKZO test that it ignores all non-
variable costs altogether, in spite of the fact that both the domi-
nant company and its competitor will normally have some costs
of this kind. In such circumstances the internal cost allocation
by the dominant company could create a barrier to entry into
the competitive market.
B. The Case Law
The issue of cross-subsidization has not been raised directly
in any case before the Community Courts. The issue was raised
indirectly in Tetra Pak I.L 4 Tetra Pak was found to have com-
mitted a range of pricing and other abuses in two different but
related markets; aseptic and non-aseptic machinery and cartons.
Tetra Pak's market shares in the aseptic and non-aseptic markets
were approximately 90% and 50%, respectively. There were also
134. See Tetra Pak II, O.J. L 72/1 (1992), on appeal Tetra Pak v. Comm'n, Case T-
83/91, [1994] E.C.R. 11-755.
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important associative links between these two markets. The
Commission's case was that Tetra Pak had engaged in predatory
pricing in relation to its Tetra Rex non-aseptic carton by pricing
below average total cost. This finding assumed that Tetra Pak
was able to incur losses in the non-aseptic sector by substantial
profits made in the monopoly aseptic sector. Tetra Pak argued
before the Community Courts that it had not engaged in cross-
financing from the aseptic to the non-aseptic sector. The Court
of First Instance did not rule on this point, but simply noted that
the "application of Article 86 [now Article' 82] of the Treaty...
does not... depend on proof that there was cross-financing be-
tween the two sectors. " 13
5
The issue has now been considered directly in the Commis-
sion's decision in Deutsche Post.13 6 The case concerned a com-
plaint brought by the international express parcel delivery com-
pany, UPS, against the incumbent German postal operator. The
allegation was that Deutsche Post was using profits from its re-
served monopoly in the reserved postal sector to cross-subsidize
a loss-making business in the competitive parcel sector and to
engage in predatory pricing. That complaint was upheld by the
Commission, which found that the parcel service was operated at
a substantial loss for several years. Without the cross-subsidies
from the reserved area, Deutsche Post would not have been able
to finance below-cost selling in the competitive parcel area for
any length of time. The Commission prohibited Deutsche Post's
sales below cost in the parcel area and ordered the structural
separation of that business from the reserved area.
The case had several unusual and significant features. First,
Deutsche Post had a statutory monopoly, and also a legal duty to
provide a universal postal service throughout Germany at stan-
dard postal rates. For this purpose it was obliged to maintain an
infrastructure, which it was able to use both for its monopoly and
its competitive services, but no part of which involved an incre-
mental cost of providing the competitive service. Second, some
of the incremental costs' of its competitive service were fixed
costs. In other words, some of the infrastructure used in this
135. Tetra Pak, [1994] E.C.R. 11-389, para. 186.
136. See Deutsche Post, O.J. L 125/27 (2001). See also European Commission,
Guidelines on the Application of the EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications Sector,
O.J. C-233/2, at 17 (1991) (predatory behavior as a result of cross-subsidisation).
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service was distinct from the infrastructure which Deutsche Post
needed and used for its universal service. Third, the Commis-
sion decided to use the concept of incremental costs in the com-
petitive market. Fourth, Deutsche Post's incremental costs of
providing the competitive service in 1990-1995 were above its
revenue from that service: in other words, by this test its prices
were predatory.
In condemning Deutsche Post's predatory pricing on the
basis of cross-subsidization, the Commission made a number of
important points:
* Cross-subsidization occurs where the earnings from a
given service do not cover the incremental costs of provid-
ing that service and where there is another service or bun-
dle of services, the earnings from which exceed the stand-
alone costs.
" The service for which revenue exceeds stand-alone cost is
the source of the cross-subsidy and the service in which
revenue does not cover the incremental costs is its desti-
nation. A profitable reserved monopoly is likely to be a
permanent source of funding, i.e., overall revenues in the
reserved area exceed its stand-alone costs. This means
that, when establishing whether the incremental costs in-
curred in providing a service in the competitive sector are
covered, the additional costs of producing that service, in-
curred solely as a result of providing the service, must be
distinguished from the common fixed costs, which are
not incurred solely as a result of this service.
* The Commission decided that infrastructure that had to
be maintained in order to provide the universal service
could not be incremental (which was clearly correct).
The Commission therefore decided that the cost of pro-
viding and maintaining the infrastructure needed for the
universal service need not be divided between the monop-
oly and the competitive service, but could be attributed
solely to the monopoly in calculating Deutsche Post's
costs in the competitive market. The Commission did not
take its analysis further because Deutsche Post's activities




1. Allocating Costs Between Two Operations
After much controversy in various industries, the Deutsche
Post decision shows that in these rather unusual circumstances
the dominant company is not required to allocate its common
costs, on any basis, between its two kinds of operations. In other
words, it may legally allocate all its common costs to its monop-
oly operations, even if they also benefit its competitive activities.
If it does this, its costs in the competitive market will be only
incremental costs, and these will be less than the stand-alone
costs of its competitor (all other things being equal). How much
less will depend on the extent of the economies of scope or syn-
ergies between the dominant company's two sets of operations.
Presumably the incremental-costs-only approach would have
been seen to be wrong if Deutsche Post had used every post of-
fice for rent-free banking, insurance, and travel agency activities.
Merely concluding that even by this standard there was preda-
tory pricing may not have been enough, since if common costs
had to be allocated the losses would have been much greater,
and competitors' claims for compensation correspondingly
larger; the quantum of predation is often important. The Com-
mission's conclusion that all the common costs could be attrib-
uted to Deutsche Post's monopoly activities was due to its univer-
sal service obligation. In other words, the same conclusion
would arguably not be reached in the case of a dominant enter-
prise with no universal service obligation, whether or not it has a
statutory monopoly.
In the unusual case in which it has been used, this approach
means that the problems of correctly allocating common costs
between the two sets of activities does not arise, and the question
of whether the dominant company's prices in the competitive
market are predatory depends only on whether they are below
its incremental costs in that market. The fact that the competi-
tor in that market has not got the advantage of economies of
scope may be a difficulty, a handicap or a barrier to entry, but it
is not one created or aggravated by the dominant company (ex-
cept in price squeeze cases). Indeed, even if the dominant com-
pany was obliged to allocate its common costs in some appropri-
ate way between its two kinds of operations, the total costs attrib-
utable to its operations in the competitive market might still be
2002]
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below the stand-alone costs of its competitor, since the dominant
company would have economies of scope and the competitor
would not.
Whether any such approach discourages a dominant com-
pany from entering a competitive market does not depend on
the merits of the Deutsche Post decision. It depends, in essence,
on whether the principle is subject to an exception of the kind
always assumed to apply in predation cases, which accepts that a
company's initial activities in a new market are likely to be un-
profitable. (This question did not arise in Deutsche Post, as the
company had lost money for five years, and had been in the
competitive market before that.) Provided that an exception of
this kind exists, the Commission's approach does not seem to
discourage legitimate competition by dominant companies. 137
In the absence of a universal service obligation, however,
the incremental-costs-only approach would be too favorable to
the dominant company because it would create or legitimize a
barrier to entry into the competitive market. In the absence of
any objective criterion such as the universal service obligation,
the dominant company would have too much freedom to decide
which of its costs in the competitive market were incremental
and which were not. A rule should not be adopted if its applica-
tion would lie essentially within the discretion of the company to
be bound by the rule. The dominant company's incremental
costs (because they can include some fixed costs) are likely to be
higher than the average variable costs of its operations in the
competitive market. If it is accepted that the incremental-costs-
only approach is not appropriate in the absence of a universal
service obligation (or the equivalent for some other reason),
then it seems that the right approach would be to require alloca-
tion of common costs on some appropriate basis. What the best
basis should be will depend on the circumstances.
2. Which Costs Do You Allocate?
It is said that neither economics nor cost-accounting impose
137. See Mats A. Bergman, A Prohibition Against Losses? The Commission's Deutsche
Post Decision, 2001 EUR. COMPETITION. L. Rv. 351, 351-54 (2001). Bergman suggests
that the decision "will curb competition on the merits. Taken to the extreme, this stan-
dard can be interpreted as a prohibition for a firm that holds a monopoly in one mar-
ket to show red figures in competitive markets." Id. at 351. This seems incorrect, for
the reason stated in the text
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one single "correct" method of cost allocation. This is no doubt
true, but it does not follow that allocation, on some consistent
and reasonable basis, is unnecessary or impossible (although it
may be difficult), or that no common costs need to be attributed
to the competitive activities. Unless there is a universal service
obligation, the dominant company should allocate or apportion
costs and can still get the benefit of the economies of scale or
scope to which it is entitled. If, on any reasonable cost allocation
method, its prices are above its costs, then the details of the cost
allocation method are unimportant. This means that it is much
easier for a complainant or regulator to argue a cross-subsidy
case than a price squeeze case.
It has been pointed out that the most obvious basis for cost
allocation, in proportion to turnover in the two sectors involved,
is defective if the lower price is predatory because it results from
an unlawful cross-subsidy. If this was the position, the cost allo-
cation might have to be recalculated using a corrected turnover
in the lower price sector. It might be important e.g., for the
rights of injured competitors to claim compensation, to calculate
the extent of predation accurately. However, cost allocation be-
tween malleable and related interoperable products in the
software industry, where the marginal cost of selling another
copy of an existing product is in any case almost zero, cannot
solve the antitrust issues that arise.
There may be a real problem if the competitive market is
not really an independent market, but is always and necessarily
merely a by-product of the market in which the dominant com-
pany is dominant (that is, the competitive market is uneconomic
except in combination with the other market). If this is the situ-
ation as a result of the inherent economics of the two markets,
then the incremental-costs-only approach might be right, be-
cause the barrier to entry into the competitive market is due to
the competitor's underlying need to enter the main market and
not to the dominant company's cost allocation. But in this situa-
tion it would be necessary to prove objectively that independent
activities in the competitive market were inherently uneconomic,
and were not uneconomic for competitors only because of pred-
atory pricing by the dominant company.
The fact that the dominant company has a statutory monop-
oly does not seem relevant to the question of abuse. It is the
statutory duties, if any, of a dominant company which justify the
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incremental-costs-only approach, not its statutory privileges.
Whether it is legally impossible for a competitor to enter the mo-
nopoly market, and not merely very difficult or impossible for
other reasons, should not alter the rule on the definition of
abuse. If there is no statutory monopoly in a given market, entry
by new competitors is always possible in theory, however un-
likely, difficult or uneconomic it may be in fact. From an eco-
nomic standpoint, an absolute legal impossibility is not very dif-
ferent from a near-impossibility for other reasons.
Finally, it is worth mentioning another, different, principle.
The Community Courts have accepted that a statutory postal mo-
nopoly may be necessary because some services are inevitably
loss-making and therefore require cross-subsidization so that the
postal service can break even overall. However, they have made
it clear that the monopoly is only justified if all the services in
question are necessarily part of the core activities and no less
restrictive solution can be found."' 8 If they are distinct services,
there is no justification for the monopoly applying to them, and
the normal rules about cross-subsidies, whatever they are, would
apply. This principle also confirms that a postal monopoly and
related competitive services should be considered separately,
and that neither should be allowed or required to cross-subsidize
the other.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it is apparent that much of Community
competition law on pricing practices is concerned with the form
of the pricing measure rather than its economic effect and impli-
cations for consumer welfare. Certain Commission statements
also seem to create per se rules, or at least strong presumptions of
illegality, against certain pricing practices. Much of Community
competition law in this area proceeds from the wrong premise.
Lower prices should in nearly all cases benefit from a strong pre-
sumption of legality. The situation should only be different
138. See Corbeau, [1993] E.C.R. 1-2533; see also European Commission, Notice from
the Commission on the application of the competition rules to the postal sector and on
the assessment of certain state measures relating to postal services, O.J. C-39/2, at 10
(1998). Deutsche Post's overall profits were substantial, and this calls into question
either the justification for its reserved monopoly or the effectiveness of the regulatory




where it is clear that, in the specific context of the market under
consideration, they distort competition in some material way be-
tween customers or create a handicap for competitors that is not
merely the result of the dominant company's offering a lower
price. In our view, the Commission should clarify its position on
pricing practices in a way that properly reflects current eco-
nomic thinking and its recently-stated objectives of safeguarding
consumer welfare rather than the position of competitors. In
light of the wording of Article 82, there are strong arguments for
saying that only the following pricing practices by dominant
companies are unlawful under Article 82:
PRINCIPLE 1. Charging a lower price on condition that the
customer buys exclusively from the dominant company will
generally be contrary to Article 82(b).
Despite some statements to the contrary, there is no rule of
Community competition law which prohibits a dominant
company from agreeing to give a price reduction on condi-
tion that the customer buys at least a specified quantity dur-
ing a specific period, or gives a reduced price for a quantity
which both parties believe is likely to be the buyer's total
requirements during the period. A basic distinction should
be made between: (i) discounts that are generally available;
and (ii) discounts that are individually negotiated with the
customer in question. If the quantity or target is not indi-
vidually negotiated with each buyer, it should normally be
unobjectionable, since it cannot (except by coincidence)
correspond to the buyer's total requirements. Even where
the discount is individually negotiated with the customer, it
is still necessary to further distinguish several situations: 139
* A dominant company should be free to grant a quantity
rebate for all of a customer's purchases if that rebate is
not conditional on that customer's not buying from
third parties. This is simply an unconditional price re-
duction.
" A dominant company can grant a discount on addi-
tional purchases made by a customer above a certain
139. These situations assume that none of the discounts would lead to predatory
pricing.
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quantity; that is simply a pro-competitive price reduc-
tion, and the buyer would be free to buy the additional
quantity from any other supplier which offered a more
favorable price for that quantity.
A price reduction given on a buyer's purchases from a
dominant supplier in a given period, which is granted
only on the condition that the total quantity exceeds a
target figure should usually be regarded as pro-compet-
itive. However, issues may arise in the context of target
or loyalty rebates if a price reduction that is applicable
for all or most of a customer's purchases from the dom-
inant company for a certain period is likely to be lost if
the customer buys from another source. The antitrust
objection is that rebates of this kind can create strong
marginal incentives for the customer not to make the
additional purchases from a company other than the
dominant firm so that, in practice, they amount to ex-
clusive or near-exclusive purchasing commitments.
Whether the target rebates gives rise to appreciable
foreclosure is highly fact-specific and requires consider-
ation of a series of factors, including: (i) the size of the
discount; (ii) whether the discount increases in a linear
manner, or in steps, and if so what the quantity is for
each step; (iii) the structure of market demand and
whether the rebate is share-stealing or market-growing
in effect (i.e., barriers to entry to the emergence of new
buyers); (iv) the length of the reference period;
(v) whether the dominant firm is an unavoidable trad-
ing partner; and (vi) the proportion of the total market
subject to the price reduction.
AVAILABLE DEFENSES. In the case of non-predatory discount-
ing practices, the unlawful practice is not the lower price but
the conditions on which it is available. This means that it
usually will not be a defense to show that the lower price was
matching or undercutting a competitor's price. However,
several other defenses will be available. In cases of exclusive
buying contracts contrary to Article 82(b), or where the
conditions of sale impose a loss or penalty if the buyer buys
from another supplier, it should be a defense that the seller
was making a substantial investment in order to supply the
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buyer, and this investment would be economic only if the
buyer bought exclusively from the dominant company.
For other rebates, the following defenses will usually be
available: (1) volume discounts/economies of scale; (2) re-
duced costs; (3) payment for services provided by the buyer;
and (4) the lower price is a pro-competitive measure to help
a class of companies, e.g., those starting up or making sub-
stantial investments. There is no requirement that the re-
bate in question should be justified by precise cost savings.
PRINCIPLE 2. Charging different prices in similar transac-
tions to customers that compete with each other is only con-
trary to Article 82(c) if the price difference is so large that it
creates a significant competitive disadvantage for the cus-
tomers paying the higher price. There is otherwise no gen-
eral prohibition on a dominant company's charging differ-
ent prices for the same product. (Discrimination by a verti-
cally-integrated dominant company against competitors in a
downstream market that rely on the dominant company for
some input is subject to different and stricter obligations
than those applicable under Article 82(c).)
However, the situations',in which a dominant company
would have the ability or incentive to charge different prices
for the same product to such an extent that they give rise to
distortions of competition between end-users will in practice
be rare. This means that Article 82(c) will mainly be rele-
vant where State-owned or controlled enterprises discrimi-
nate against companies from other Member States. Article
82(c) is therefore much narrower in scope than the (much-
criticized) price-discrimination provisions of the U.S. Robin-
son-Patman Act; in addition, there are defenses under Arti-
cle 82(c) that are excluded by that Act.
AVALABLE DEFENSES. As in the case of rebate practices, the
following defenses are generally valid: (1) quantity rebates;
(2) meeting or undercutting a competitor's price; (3) re-
duced costs; (4) payment for services provided by the buyer;
and (5) start-up prices.
PRINCIPLE 3. Charging a price (whether selective or not)
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which is below the dominant company's average variable
cost of selling the kind of product or service in question will
usually be contrary to Article 82(b) unless a defense is avail-
able.
AVAILABLE DEFENSES. In cases of prices below average varia-
ble costs, the following defenses are valid: (1) the dominant
seller did not know that its price was below its average varia-
ble costs; (2) the sales in question were the seller's first sales
in a new market, made before it could have covered its aver-
age variable costs; (3) the sale (or other transaction) is a
short-term promotion or trial offer made to call attention to
the product in question; and (4) the sale is a loss-leader,
that is, it is made to attract customers who will in practice
buy quantities of other products or services sufficient to
compensate for the loss on the product or service sold be-
low cost. This defense does not apply, however, if the prod-
uct used regularly or for a significant period as the loss
leader is the only product made by a competitor. Meeting
competition should also be a defense, although the domi-
nant firm should arguably only be allowed to meet, but not
undercut, the lower price offered by a rival.
PRINCIPLE 4. Charging a price (whether selective or not)
which is above the dominant firm's average variable cost
should only be contrary to Article 82 (b) if the price is linked
with other clearly exclusionary conduct or is otherwise
shown to be part of an unlawful plan to force a competitor
out of the market.
AVAILABLE DEFENSES. In cases of prices below average total
cost but above average variable cost, it should be a defense
that the price was loss-minimizing or profit-maximizing in
the circumstances at the time. The defense of meeting
competition will also be available and the dominant firm
should be allowed to meet and undercut a rival's offer, as
long as the price remains above average variable cost.
